



University of Brasília

Faculty of Economics, Administration, Accounting and Public Policy Management

Department of Administration

BRUNO FERREIRA LINDENBERG

**COLLABORATIVE CRISIS MANAGEMENT: The United Nations  
Response to the Influx of Venezuelan Migrants in Brazil**

Brasília - DF

2021

BRUNO FERREIRA LINDENBERG

**COLLABORATIVE CRISIS MANAGEMENT: The United Nations  
Response to the Influx of Venezuelan Migrants in Brazil**

This final paper was presented to the Department of Administration as a partial requirement to obtain a Bachelor of Business degree.

Mentor: Dr. Siegrid Guillaumon Dechandt.

Brasília – DF

2021

BRUNO FERREIRA LINDENBERG

**COLLABORATIVE CRISIS MANAGEMENT: The United Nations  
Response to the Influx of Venezuelan Migrants in Brazil**

A Comissão Examinadora, abaixo identificada, aprova o Trabalho de Conclusão do Curso de Administração da Universidade de Brasília do aluno

**BRUNO FERREIRA LINDENBERG**

Doutora, Siegrid Guillaumon Dechandt

Professora-Orientadora

Mestre, Jaqueline Gil

Professora-Examinadora

Doutor, Diego Vieira

Professor-Examinador

Brasília, 21 de maio de 2021.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

À minha mãe Iris e ao meu pai Roberto que tiveram a força, a determinação e a coragem para quebrar o ciclo de pobreza deste país; que me nutriram com o amor mais profundo que coloco em tudo que faço. Quando penso em tudo aquilo que tenho de bom em mim, eu vejo seu reflexo.

À minha avó Carmelita, de quem herdei toda a minha capacidade de sonhar e acreditar.

Ao meu anjo da guarda, Augusto, quem eu tenho a honra de chamar de amigo.

À professora que é luz e transformação no ensino superior brasileiro e quem me concedeu o privilégio de me acompanhar nestes meus últimos 2 anos de jornada da graduação, Siegrid.

À minha família, professores e amigos.

À universidade pública, gratuita, de qualidade, acolhedora da pluralidade de pensamentos e de identidades, fomento do pensamento crítico, vigilante, propositivo e inovador, a casa de todas e todos, instrumento de transformação social, e, acima de tudo e por todos os motivos anteriores, guardiã e protetora do nosso futuro.

So long as there shall exist, by reason of law and custom, a social condemnation, which, in the face of civilization, artificially creates hells on earth, and complicates a destiny that is divine, with human fatality; so long as the three problems of the age — the degradation of man by poverty, the ruin of women by starvation, and the dwarfing of childhood by physical and spiritual night — are not solved; so long as, in certain regions, social asphyxia shall be possible; in other words, and from a yet more extended point of view, so long as ignorance and misery remain on earth, books like this cannot be useless.

Victor Hugo, 1862

## ABSTRACT

This paper aims to present how the United Nations agencies, funds, and programs manage Venezuelans' migration crisis in Brazil and which is their degree of interaction in this arrangement. In crisis management and humanitarian assistance – where resources are limited and should spend effectively – adequately managing interinstitutional interaction is keen to deliver the most needed aid and guarantee accountability to affected populations. Building up on Crisis Management (CM) literature and standing on the newborn concept of Collaborative Crisis Management (CCM), this paper presents how is organized the international humanitarian response system. In sequence, it explores which international organizations would be responsible for responding to crisis, their mandate, and how they are present in Brazil. Also, the case study presents their degree of institutional interaction: collaboration, the most complex among all possible. Finally, it presents how this case study connects with the complex dynamic of international development – and underdevelopment – to which further studies may contribute to addressing the vulnerability of systems, prevent institutional failure, and promote national resilience of society, also acting to eradicate poverty. Key characteristics of this research are: fundamental, observational, qualitative, both exploratory and explanatory, focused on documental research and retrospective analysis.

Keywords: Collaborative Crisis Management, Humanitarian Response, United Nations.

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 – Trajectories of crisis.....	19
Figure 2 – Relationship between disasters and underdevelopment.....	26
Figure 3 – Methodological components.....	31
Figure 4 – Analytical map.....	36
Figure 5 – IASC Humanitarian Coordination Architecture.....	41
Figure 6 – Cluster lead agencies by sector.....	42
Figure 7 – Operational complexity of each cluster according to 3 selected variants, before and during the COVID-19 pandemic.....	49
Figure 8 – Financial requirements by organization for the year 2021.....	50
Figure 9 – United Nations House in Brazil (Brasília, Federal District).....	51
Figure 10 – Chart of the United Nations System.....	87

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 – Total refugees and migrants by country as of March 2021.....	14
Table 2 – Classification of institutions responding to a crisis.....	21
Table 3 – Summary of key characteristics of the Four Cs.....	23
Table 4 – Comparative table between lead organizations as cluster approach plan and actual organizations responding.....	44
Table 5 – Members of the UNCT in Brazil as on 22 October 2020.....	83



## LIST OF ACRONYMS

AFPs - Agencies, Funds, and Programs

CM - Crisis Management

CCM - Collaborative Crisis Management

CPM - Collaborative Public Management

CRED – Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters

HRW - Human Rights Watch

ICC - International Criminal Court

ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross

IMF - International Monetary Fund

IOG - Institute on Governance

IOM - International Organization for Migrants

LAC - Latin America and the Caribbean

NGO - Non-Governmental Organization

OCHA - United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OHCHR - United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

PiN - People in Need

R4V - Response for Venezuelans

RMRP - Refugee and Migrant Response Plan

UN - United Nations

UNCT - United Nations Country Team

UNDP - United Nations Development Programme

UNFPA - United Nations Population Fund

UNGA - United Nations General Assembly

UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF - United Nations Children's Fund

UNISDR – United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction

UNSC - United Nations Security Council

UNSG - United Nations Secretary-General

WASH - Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>ABSTRACT</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>11</b>
Contextualization	11
Problem Statement	14
General Objective	15
Specific Objectives	15
Justification	15
<b>THEORETICAL REVIEW</b>	<b>17</b>
Crisis	17
Crisis Management (CM)	19
Crisis, Underdevelopment, and Resilience of Society	24
<b>RESEARCH METHODS</b>	<b>27</b>
Research Strategy: Case Study	27
Classification of the research	28
Methodological Components	29
Research Context: Crisis, Underdevelopment, and Resilience	30
Case: United Nations and humanitarian aid	31
Object: United Nations Agencies, Funds, and Programmes involved in the humanitarian response in Brazil	31
Focus: Crisis Management (CM) of United Nations Agencies, Funds, and Programmes in response to the humanitarian crisis in Brazil	32
Unit of Analysis: Collaborative Crisis Management (CCM)	32
Data collection, processing, and analysis	33
Analytical Map for Data Collection	35
<b>RESULTS AND DISCUSSION</b>	<b>38</b>
The International Humanitarian Response System and the Cluster Approach	38
Cluster lead agencies and their presence in Brazil	43
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	49
International Organization for Migration (IOM)	50

	10
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	51
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	52
Save the Children	53
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)	53
World Food Programme (WFP)	54
World Health Organization (WHO)	55
International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)	55
Collaborative Crisis Management: United Nations response to the influx of Venezuelan migrants in Brazil	56
<b>CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION</b>	<b>68</b>
<b>REFERENCES</b>	<b>71</b>
<b>APPENDIX A - Members of the United Nations Country Team in Brazil</b>	<b>83</b>
<b>ANNEX A – Chart of the United Nations System</b>	<b>85</b>

# 1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter offers a retrospect of the Venezuelan crisis, its progression over the past decades, aiming to disclose the roots of the high influx of migrants in Brazil. Thenceforth the problem statement of this paper will be presented, followed by research general and specific objectives, and finally, its justification.

## 1.1 Contextualization

TV news, newspaper headlines, political speeches and Internet tweets, used to deliver foci and outlets for public anxieties and fears, are currently overflowing with references to the 'migration crisis' [...]. The impact of the news broadcast from that battlefield now comes close to causing a veritable 'moral panic'. [...] Signs are piling up that public opinion, in cahoots with the ratings covetous media, is gradually yet relentlessly approaching the point of 'refugee tragedy fatigue'. (BAUMAN, 2016)

Many influential newspapers, such as The New York Times (2019) and Al Jazeera (2019), dedicated articles to explain how Venezuela trampled and became the focus of international attention for its political instability, economic failure critical social conditions.

The economic situation in Venezuela deteriorated over the past few years. In 2019, the real GDP decreased by 35%. The last available data points out that 35,5% of the Venezuelan labor force had no employment in 2018. The country observed high variations in the average consumer price index - CPI: from 1980 to 2014, inflation rates varied between 6.2% and 99.9%. Nevertheless, in the past 5 years inflation rates exceeded historical records: 121.7% in 2015, 254.9% in 2016, 438.1% in 2017, 65,374.1% in 2018 and 19,906% in 2019 (IMF, 2020).

The economy of Venezuela was, for decades, prosperous for its oil reserves. High prices in the international market and high-profit rates sustained substantial investments in social programs, generating wealth. However, under the government of Hugo Chavez (1998 to 2013), corruption and misuse of resources growth slowed down. In addition, oil prices in the international market began to fall, leaving the country's economy and domestic investments in a complicated situation (AL JAZEERA, 2019; THE NEW YORK TIMES, 2019). Followed by the death of Hugo Chavez

in 2013, the already delicate economic situation of the country worsened under the leadership of Nicolás Maduro. In 2019, after the alleged fraudulent reelection of Nicolás Maduro for a second term, the figure of Juan Guaidó - President of the Venezuelan National Assembly - arose as he declared himself president. Guaidó received international support from many countries, defending new general elections. Supporters from both sides took the streets in the following weeks (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 2019).

In this tense scenario, Venezuelan forces systematically oppressed demonstrations, followed by a series of Human Rights violations. Amnesty International (2019) and Human Rights Watch - HRW (2020) reported systematic persecution of political opponents, representing an offense to the right to freedom of expression, assembly, and association. According to these organizations, this represents a threat to political leaders of the opposition and human rights defenders who have been targets of the government and security forces.

Both the Human Rights Watch (2020) and Amnesty International (2020) give special attention to extrajudicial executions, torture, and ill-treatment against those opposing Nicolás Maduro. Although there is no centralized and reliable source of information, the HRW (2020) estimates 18,000 extrajudicially executed people by Venezuelan security forces between 2016 and 2019. In addition, reports also mention impunity. Tribunals have no judicial independence from the executive power, culminating in arbitrary detention in prisons with critical conditions.

Taking the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court - ICC (1998) into account, those systematic actions of the government would be characterized as crimes against humanity (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 2019).

[...] "crime against humanity" means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:

(a) Murder; [...]

(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law;

(f) Torture; [...]

(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender [...], or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law [...];

- (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; [...]
  - (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
- (ICC, 1998, p.3)

The UN Security Council<sup>1</sup> brought its attention to Venezuela for the first time in January 2019. On occasion, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs briefed the Council on the deterioration of the economic and political situation in the country, endorsing the UN Secretary General's request for non-escalation of the crisis. In April 2019, happened the 4th and last meeting of the UNSC on the situation in Venezuela. At the time, the Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator stated that 7 million people needed humanitarian assistance, which represented 25% of the country's population at the time, according to estimates from UN sources (UNITED NATIONS, 2019<sup>2</sup>).

International organizations have been fundamental to the humanitarian response and relief in Venezuela. In 2019, the International Committee of the Red Cross was responsible for delivering 320 tons of medical supplies and the treatment of 195,596 people in the country. In addition, the institution made substantial improvements to the health care system and to local infrastructure that directly affects the population's health, such as WASH (ICRC, 2019).

As a result, Latin America and the Caribbean - LAC observed an increasing number of refugees, migrants, and asylum-seekers from Venezuela in the past years. The R4V Platform declared a total number of 5,577,077 refugees and migrants from Venezuela as of March 2021<sup>3</sup>. When it comes to pending asylum claims, there were 798,276 on the same date. Information gathered on the Regional RMRP<sup>4</sup> for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela shows that the flow of Venezuelans across Latin America is uneven between countries (R4V, 2019).

---

<sup>1</sup> The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the most powerful institution of the UN and among international organizations (ORAKHELASHVILI, 2005). Its main responsibility is to maintain “international peace and security”, being entitled to the use of multiple means to act, including force and military action of UN Members. The UN Security Council was established by the United Nations Charter, which was signed on 16 June 1945, effective on 24 October 1945 (UNITED NATIONS, 1945).

<sup>2</sup> According to the United Nations Security Council 8452<sup>nd</sup> meeting transcript.

<sup>3</sup> Dashboard with real time updates available at: <https://r4v.info/en/situations/platform>.

<sup>4</sup> The Regional Refugees and Migrants Response Plan for Refugees and Migrants for Venezuela is a document published in 2019 by Response for Venezuelans - R4V platform (R4V, 2019).

**TABLE 1**Total refugees and migrants by country as of March 2021<sup>5</sup>

North and Central America		South America		Caribbean	
Belize	Not informed	Argentina	179,203	Aruba	Not informed
Canada	20,775	Bolivia	9,956	Cuba	Not informed
Costa Rica	29,820	Brazil	261,441	Curacao	17,000
El Salvador	Not informed	Chile	457,324	Dominican Republic	114,500
Guatemala	Not informed	Colombia	1,742,927	Haiti	Not informed
Honduras	Not informed	Ecuador	443,705	Guadeloupe	Not informed
Mexico	101,648	French Guiana	Not informed	Puerto Rico	Not informed
Nicaragua	Not informed	Guyana	23,310	Saint-Barthélemy	Not informed
Panama	121,601	Paraguay	4,934	Saint-Martin	Not informed
United States	394,000	Peru	1,043,460	Trinidad and Tobago	24,169
		Suriname	Not informed		
		Uruguay	14,926		

Source: R4V, 2021; elaborated by the author.

## 1.2 Problem Statement

Humanitarian crises are often not analyzed in-depth, compromising future studies.

In this complex context, the research question that motivates this paper arises: how UN agencies, funds, and programs in Brazil manage the migration crisis, and what is their degree of institutional interaction?

<sup>5</sup> Numbers reported by host governments by March 2021, reflecting the most recent data reported by each government based on its own methodology of data gathering and processing (R4V, 2021).

### **1.3 General Objective**

Therefore, this paper aims to understand how United Nations agencies, funds, and programs in Brazil manage Venezuelans' migration crisis and the degree of institutional interaction in this arrangement.

### **1.4 Specific Objectives**

- Identify which United Nations agencies, funds, and programs have direct and national participation in response to the influx of Venezuelan migrants in Brazil and how they interact to deliver results.
- Describe the institutional arrangements of UN AFPs to respond to the migration crisis and how it allows opportunities for collaboration.
- Present the role of international organizations - the United Nations and humanitarian relief organizations - in a global crisis and describe their presence in Brazil.

### **1.5 Justification**

After the Second World War, humanitarian efforts had limited coordinated efforts, more focused on Europe recuperation to the conflict. By that time, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was the leading international humanitarian organization. In 1945, following the founding of the United Nations and the creation of its agencies, funds, and programs, more attention was brought to the coordination of humanitarian assistance (OCHA, 2012).

The first chapter of the UN Charter already perpetrates as the organization's purpose: "To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character [...]" (United Nations, 1945). UN's first major decision to coordinate humanitarian actions was taken on 14 December 1971. General Assembly Resolution 2816 created the figure of the Disaster Relief Coordinator: a high-level staff who directly reports to the UN Secretary-General and is responsible for the mobilization and coordination of humanitarian actions between member states, UN AFPs, and other relevant players (United Nations, 1971).



As it will be presented in-depth further, each crisis is unique and will have a specific arrangement of institutions and a combination of players and challenges. The broad number of actors involved and human suffering are core components that require effective institutional mechanisms in place in order to guarantee accountability to affected populations and people in need. In this context, it is necessary to coordinate actions between relevant local, national, and international actors to respond effectively to the large scale of the humanitarian crisis of Venezuelan refugees, migrants, and asylum-seekers across LAC (R4V, 2019).

## 2 THEORETICAL REVIEW

This chapter presents how Crisis Management (CM) emerged as a relevant research topic in the past decades and offers a theoretical framework to describe the interaction between relevant actors in the context of humanitarian crisis. It also presents how crisis and underdevelopment are closely related and how institutions have a crucial role in its dynamic.

It is keen to have a clear look at core concepts to have a solid theoretical framework. First and foremost, the difference between crisis, hazards, emergencies, and disasters should be pointed out since the word choice may determine the combination of decisions, methods, and policies applied to a particular context. In 2016, Al-Dahash, Thayaparan, and Kulatunga conducted a literature review to clarify which characteristics define each term. According to their work, although this distinction is needed, these terms are frequently "used interchangeably." When comparing the characteristics listed by these authors and the "features in emergency management" pointed by UNHCR (2007), no equivalency could be established. Therefore, it is not possible to find consensus and common terminology.

With that in mind, both crisis and emergency terminologies will coexist in this paper. Although "emergency" is the terminology adopted by UNHCR and other United Nations AFPs when referring to a practical response to an urgent refugee situation, as the majority of scholars and research mostly lie on the concept of Crisis Management (CM), "crisis" will be prioritized in this text. Considering that some authors defend that a disaster is "concentrated in time and space" (AL-DAHASH; THAYAPARAN; KULATUNGA, 2016), this term indicates the acute phase of a crisis will be explained in-depth further in this paper.

### 2.1 Crisis

Either natural or human-made causes will trigger a crisis. Natural causes may have a sudden impact on society (e.g., earthquakes and tsunamis), a slow-onset (e.g., drought, famine, and pest infestation), or have roots in epidemic diseases (e.g., water-borne and food-borne). On the other hand, human actions also trigger a crisis and are divided between those with industrial or technological roots (e.g., pollution, fires, spillages, and explosions) and complex emergencies (e.g., wars, civil strife, and armed aggression) (ANDERSON; GEBER, 2018). In 1994, the United

Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee<sup>6</sup> (IASC) established a standard definition for complex emergencies, invoking interaction between institutions to cope with urgent humanitarian needs:

A humanitarian crisis which occurs in a country, region, or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from civil conflict and/or foreign aggression; [...] which requires an international response which goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency. (IASC, 1994)

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - OCHA (1999) establishes four fundamental aspects of complex emergencies:

- Extensive violence and loss of life; massive displacements of people; widespread damage to societies and economies;
- The need for large scale, multi-faceted humanitarian assistance;
- The hindrance or prevention of humanitarian assistance by political and military constraints;
- Significant security risks for humanitarian relief workers in some areas. (OCHA, 1999)

Humanitarian crises go through 4 phases: pre-crisis, acute, post-crisis, and recovery. In the pre-crisis phase, plans and guidance are established to prepare organizations for the subsequent phase: acute, when the outbreak of a situation triggers the crisis response system. During the post-crisis, the mortality rate reduces, and longer-term options begin to be pursued. As the crisis comes to an end, the recovery phase encloses with the exit of expanding organizations (definition to be given forward in the text) and shift of responsibilities to local authorities (ANDERSON; GEBER, 2018). Bynander and Nohrstedt (2020) identified four crisis trajectories, based on their on-set and resolution, summarized in Figure 1.

---

<sup>6</sup> The Inter-Agency Standing Committee was created by the United Nations General Assembly in 1992 to work as a forum for humanitarian coordination between both UN and non-UN actors involved in complex crises. One of its key principles is the respect to the specific mandate of each of its members (AISC, 2020).




FIGURE 1 - Trajectories of crisis

Source: elaborated by the author; NOHRSTEDT; BYNANDER, 2020.

## 2.2 Crisis Management (CM)

Each crisis is unique and will demand a different combination of measures, mobilization of actors, and institutional arrangements to comply with the needs a crisis imposes. Managing complex crises requires joint efforts between institutions. As the IASC definition states, no single institution may deliver all results and perform all actions needed to resolve a complex emergency/crisis. Although some accredit specific institutional architectures to effective crisis management, researchers affirm that an effective crisis response system is given by two core factors: flexibility and adequate flow of information – opposing to reliance on command and overflow of information (BOIN; HART, 2010).

Crisis presents unpredictable and unstable scenarios, requiring constant and dynamic adjustments to cope with objectives and deliver results (BOIN; HART, 2010). Although traditional literature states that leadership and management become centralized in the context of crisis (HART; ROSENTHAL; KOUZMIN, 1993; KAPUCU; GARAYEV, 2011), this is not mandatory component of an effective crisis response system (BOIN; HART, 2010). By this means, both centralized and decentralized structures may be effective depending on the crisis.

The communication factor can be considered in different spheres, but culture imposes challenges to the interaction between teams and organizations. Communication will be fundamental to developing an effective crisis response network as it allows isolated mechanisms to act together as a whole. Barriers between institutions are considered the main challenge in most crises. Bringing together institutions with different mandates, objectives and aligning varied *modus operandi* requires leadership and communication/relationship lines established before the crisis. (BOIN; HART, 2010)

As foreseen by the PDCA cycle (plan, do, control, act), organizations should establish plans to prepare relevant actors better to respond in the context of a crisis. This phase occurs when establishing standards – what to expect from each actor – and criteria – what to consider when making decisions – to reach particular objectives (CHIAVENATO, 2011). Through the study of good practices, Boin and Hart (2010) listed four core components of effective crisis planning:

- A combination of generic and specific scenarios approaches and plans;
- Establishment of activity clusters among probable crisis response actors;
- Management of public expectations through the involvement of crisis response actors – including the community – and good communication between them;
- Constant reassessment and adjustment of crisis planning should be performed before, during, and after a crisis.

Recurring and small-scale crises can be significantly managed using guidance and plans established at the planning phase. On the other hand, some plans may not endure when applied to a bigger-scale crisis. This does not disqualify the importance of planning but reinforces the need to establish well-developed plans that offer helpful support to managers, mainly at the early and acute stages of a crisis (BOIN; HART, 2010).

While a country's governance structure will be defined by multiple actors – with special attention given to political and economic institutions, individuals, and organizations – (AHRENS; RUDOLPH, 2006), the governance structure of a crisis response system will be constituted by its inter-organizational arrangement. Given the relation between crisis and underdevelopment, effective governance allows adequate interaction of actors in order to guarantee community resilience before and after a crisis. Knowing that governance is a powerful tool to respond to those realities, by the other hand, ineffective governance can be tracked as a cause of both crisis and underdevelopment (AHRENS; RUDOLPH, 2006).

Organizations part of crisis response (crisis governance structure) are divided into four different groups, depending on the relation of their mandate with crisis response and mechanisms to respond to a crisis: established, extending, expanding, and emergent organizations (DYNES, 1970; QUARANTELLI, 1977 apud BOIN; HART, 2010; BYNANDER; NOHRSTEDT, 2020).

**TABLE 2**

Classification of institutions responding to a crisis.

	<b>The mandate of the organization directly relates to crisis response</b>	<b>The mandate of the organization is not related to crisis response</b>
<b>The organization already has mechanisms to respond</b>	<b>Established:</b> first responders. It is characterized by its speed, public support, and preparation for crisis outbreaks.	<b>Extending:</b> social services. Characterized by its bureaucracy and need to adapt its operations in the urge of a crisis.
<b>The organization must create new mechanisms to respond</b>	<b>Expanding:</b> international and relief organizations. Although their mandate covers crisis response, they are also committed to other activities and demands beyond crisis response. They support the work of extending organizations.	<b>Emerging:</b> organizations created to satisfy an urgent need of a particular crisis. Their structures and roles tend to be confusing. Often add tension to the scenario when interacting with the other types of organizations.

Source: elaborated by the author; DYNES (1970); QUARANTELLI (1977) apud BOIN; HART, 2010; BYNANDER; NOHRSTEDT, 2020.

As a crisis undergoes, different categories of organizations lead the crisis response and are present to different extents. During the acute and initial phase of an emergency, established organizations occupy a fundamental and leading role. In a second phase, focus shifts to extending organizations as social consequences of a crisis will attract most of the attention. At this phase, expanding organizations also deploy personnel to support the work performed by extending organizations. Emerging organizations may be formed in any crisis phase, and crisis plans may forecast their creation. Usually, a crisis response system is overpopulated, and although emerging organizations play a fundamental role, it constantly puts additional tension to an already tense scenario (BOIN; HART, 2010).

Nevertheless, an essential highlight in governance is that the private actors alone will not guarantee the delivery of socially relevant governance structures. Because of this, the public sector

- as we can infer, the state - must be active and present to redirect efforts if needed (AHRENS; RUDOLPH, 2006). This is represented chiefly by established and expanding organizations mentioned just above.

Naturally, different emergencies will have different institutional arrangements and degrees of interaction between institutions. Leo Denise (1999) defined C-Three: communication, coordination, and cooperation.

- Communication stands for the flow of information within and between organizations, considering actors and institutions may have varying readings of the same situation (DENISE, 1999);
- Coordination stands for how processes are managed, so each part knows when and how to act while cutting duplicate work; it represents efficiency;
- Cooperation is about getting to know collective needs and using individual perspectives to add different views and approaches to the same situation. Rather than performance, it focuses on the cultural aspects of organizations (DENISE, 1999).

Leo Denise (1999) adds a new word to the C-Three trilogy: collaboration.

Collaboration benefits from shared information during communication, although not limited to it. Collaboration opposed to coordination, considering it requires flexibility rather than process-focused. Most importantly, "collaboration thrives on differences and requires the sparks of dissent," unlike cooperation (DENISE, 1999, p. 3). Governance structures of crisis often observe situations of discordance and conflict between institutions and categories of actors (BYNANDER; NOHRSTEDT, 2020). It is critical to understand that dissent constitutes a fundamental part of this profound degree of interaction which is collaboration; it does not disqualify collaboration in any way. Dissent is paramount to collaboration (DENISE, 1999).

In 2016, Eric Martin, Isabelle Nolte, and Emma Vitolo conducted a literature review on research dealing with any of Four Cs in a disaster context. It mapped key characteristics mentioned among research papers and created the summary table below – although this paper may benefit from this general overlook, authors made clear consensus is yet to be achieved between scholars.

### **TABLE 3**

Summary of key characteristics of the Four Cs.

	<b>Communication</b>	<b>Cooperation</b>	<b>Coordination</b>	<b>Collaboration</b>
<b>Cost of interaction</b>	Low	Medium	Medium	High
<b>Degree of embeddedness</b>	Low	Medium	High	High
<b>Following of common goals</b>	Low	Medium	High	High
<b>Frequency of interaction</b>	Low	Medium	Medium	High
<b>Reciprocity</b>	Low	Medium	High	High
<b>Shared Resources</b>	Low	Medium	Medium	High
<b>Shared risk</b>	Low	Medium	Medium	High

Source: MARTIN et al., 2016.

Martin et al. (2016) mentions that a hierarchy between these terms may be implied in some research, creating a kind of complexity gradient that goes from communication, grows through cooperation and coordination, finding its ground on collaboration.

Communication is the most basic inter-organizational relationship, requiring primary efforts for interaction (MARTIN et al., 2016).

Kettl (2003, apud MARTIN et al., 2016) states that complexity in coordination may require managers to break problems into different groups to facilitate management. Following Kettl's train of thought, this would indeed apply to collaboration to a greater extent.

Not only can collaboration play an important role when managing a crisis, indeed it constitutes a fundamental role in its dynamic. Combining critical aspects of both Crisis Management (CM) and Collaborative Public Management (CPM) can advance comprehension towards another field of study: Collaborative Crisis Management (CCM). Relevant articles on Crisis Management (CM) linked to Collaborative Public Management (CPM) are dated from 1990 (NOHRSTEDT et al., 2018, p. 259). Although the study of CCM has grown in the past decade, there is still little work on migration, refugee, and humanitarian specific matters. A basic search in the Scopus abstract and citation database identified only 47 documents that mentioned CCM and migration, migrants, refugee, refugee, or humanitarian.

In 2020, Frederik Bynander and Daniel Nohrstedt published the first edition of the book "Collaborative Crisis Management: Inter-Organizational Approaches to Extreme Events". It



represents one of the most extensive efforts to a cohesive understanding of how collaboration can play a decisive role in crisis management. In the past, researchers have mobilized knowledge from correlated social sciences fields – collaborative governance and collaborative public management in particular –, but the authors are clear when stating that this field of study is full of "conceptual confusion". Therefore, it is keen to work towards a harmonized definition of Collaborative Crisis Management, which Bynander and Nohrstedt propose as: "[...] involving joint efforts of multiple autonomous actors to work across organizational borders, levels of authority, and sectors to prepare for, respond to, and learn from risks and extreme events that disrupt our modern society".

As described, modern society is unstable, and the need for constant adaptation and collaboration is imposed on organizations. Although the importance of collaboration in extreme events is recognized, past experiences have proved that the joint work between organizations is complex. Considering collaboration is usually surrounded by expectations from various actors, the incapacity to deliver an effective response can result in frustration. Considering that researchers identified and deeply studied no standard collaboration configurations, equating those overlapping interactions is a challenge to crisis managers. Those exact expectations occur as a result of how "strategic development" advanced through history and was adopted by countries. From 1991, the world observed a transition of focus from territorial integrity to societal security, which is based on the close relationship between three key trends: cross-sectoral collaboration, societal resilience, and vulnerabilities and risk reduction (BYNANDER; NOHRSTEDT, 2020; HART; SUNDELIUS, 2013).

## **2.1 Crisis, Underdevelopment, and Resilience of Society**

There is a range of challenges, such as climate change, unplanned-urbanization, under-development/poverty as well as the threat of pandemics, that will shape humanitarian assistance in the future. These aggravating factors will result in increased frequency, complexity and severity of disasters. (IFRC, 2021)

Vulnerability and resilience compose a continuum, therefore a linear scale of a society's response to a crisis and its ability to bounce back from disturbance and resist (PEARCE; LEE, 2018). Research shows that the susceptibility of societies to crises is both cause and consequence of underdevelopment and poverty. Therefore, it constitutes a vicious cycle of constant and growing

social vulnerability (AHRENS; RUDOLPH, 2006; ACEMOGLU; ROBINSON, 2012). As crisis and underdevelopment can be prevented by solid national institutions and an effective governance system, the contrary is also correct; institutional failure and lack of effective crisis response systems undermine valuable assets of a society. The least developed and emerging countries would naturally be more susceptible to face difficulties in crisis response (AHRENS; RUDOLPH, 2006). This relationship is illustrated in Figure 2.

Nevertheless, the personal skills and capacities of the affected population in a humanitarian crisis offer an underutilized potential and capacity to drive and streamline social change. If considering personal skills and capacities in social protection are essential to potentialize humanitarian protection (PEARCE; LEE, 2018) and underdevelopment is strongly linked to institutional failure (AHRENS; RUDOLPH, 2006), the institutional building should be sensible to the heterogeneous aspect of societies. In this sense, some factors may be considered: mapping the potential and varied risks to which a population is susceptible, identifying protection gaps, and guaranteeing the high responsiveness and resilience of the system.

Moreover, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson have studied such complex dynamics in the book "Why Nations Fail: the origins of power, prosperity, and poverty" (2012). This important research brought significant contributions, but the answer to the question proposed in the title is that besides many factors such as geography and culture, the catalyst of a nation's failure lies in the performance of national institutions. Nevertheless, behind institutional performance will be political affairs: the critical vector of institutional change determining its strength or weakness/fragility. Following this line of thought, political events do have the power to settle which paths an institution will take towards either vulnerability or resilience. Thereupon, attention shall be brought to the potential of both political events and institutions to promote social change or, as well, the other way around: "institutions that create poverty generate negative feedback loops and endure" (ACEMOGLU; ROBINSON, 2012, p. 335).

This analysis is vital to understand and promote social change at the national and, subsequently, international level. Poverty is not an unsolvable matter in society: it does have to be addressed strategically by evidence-based approaches. There is an uncountable number of variants to coordinate in a nation to prevent it from failure. However, some previous successful international experiences provide us rich knowledge to understand what to do – and what to do not do (ACEMOGLU; ROBINSON, 2012).




FIGURE 2: Relationship between disasters and underdevelopment

Source: AHRENS, J.; RUDOLPH, P. M., 2006, p. 209.

### 3 RESEARCH METHODS

This chapter explains what constitutes a case study and why it is presented as the ideal qualitative research method to answer the research question and better develop around this paper's general and specific objectives. It also presents which are the methodological components (layers) of this analysis: (1) research context, (2) case, (3) object, (4) focus, and (5) unit of analysis. In the end, an analytic map for data collection, processing, and analysis is offered – which works as a roadmap for the case study proposed in this paper.

#### 3.1 Research Strategy: Case Study

According to Robert Yin (1994), case studies are a valuable tool to establish relations and connections between different actors and processes. Therefore,

Robert Yin (1994) presents case studies as a research strategy through which data will be collected and why decisions are made. Case studies will be strategically helpful when the object studied constantly and dynamically interacts with the broad context it is inserted. By this means, it is given that a case study should cover fundamental links between the object and the context, establishing cause-consequence relations. This will require a combination of different investigation techniques; field work might also be considered, given the need to fill in knowledge gaps that such a complex research object may have.

A case study researcher should present some characteristics that provide solid ground to the paper: great questioning, listening competencies, adaptability and flexibility to change the initial plan as needed, great domain of topics relevant to the research, no prior judgment over the object of and field of study - represented by the ability to accept and present a different hypothesis than initially thought (YIN, 1994).

According to Robert Yin (1994), being a research strategy, a case study should depart from an investigation plan. The investigation plan acts as a roadmap that is planned to guide the research, maintaining focus while providing space to adjust the "research route" as the phenomena is better understood; it is composed of:

- Pre-defined questions that drive the study and clearly expose which knowledge gap shall be filled. This was addressed at the introduction through the problem

statement, the general and specific objectives, and the research justification. Many questions can be made, but "why?" and "how?" are complementary indicators of the case study as the appropriate research strategy. As it will be seen, "how?" is inserted at the core of the research: the unit of analysis.

- Initial propositions that may be tested, if any. Although some propositions on the degree of interaction between UN AFPs were made initially, some effort was made not to have it as part of the research, intending to avoid pre-judgment that may have influenced data collection and presentation of results. Once the research questions are broad provocations that initiate the discussion, one of the main functions of the initial proposition is to guide the study and to show the researcher which information is a priority during data collection. In this sense, this function is performed by the author's insertion in the environment being studied, naturally working as a filter and pre-knowledge that facilitates decision-making during the process. Also, this same "guidance function" is, in this paper, compensated at the introduction through a factual problem statement, general and specific objectives, and justification.
- Units of analysis, which is presented at the end of this chapter through an analytical map. It will compose the most micro topic assessed in the research and the core of the analysis. The unit of analysis is the last methodological component; therefore, its function will be shown in depth in this same chapter.
- A solid link between questions, data, and propositions (defined in advance or afterward). This is done here by the careful development of the narrative line that connects all layers of analysis, presents the data collected, and discusses the results. Also, this same chapter 3 presents an analytical map that illustrates how solid vital concepts and analytical categories fill each methodological component.
- Definition of criteria and methods to interpret key findings, grounding the research results on objective criteria.

### **3.2 Classification of the research**

Guided by the work "Methodology of Scientific Research: Guidelines for the preparation of a research protocol" (FONTELLES ET AL., 2009), this research is:

- Basic and fundamental, once it focuses on the acquirement of new knowledge by the researcher, academic research and bachelor's degree papers included.
- Observational, once it does not propose any intervention as a research result.
- Qualitative, once complex social phenomena is at the center of the analysis, with little attention to numeric representations.
- Both exploratory and explanatory. Any explanatory research would require solid exploratory grounds and already generated knowledge. Since no previous papers on the subject summarized all crucial matters, both fronts needed to be developed.
- Documental research, given it, is focused on the analysis of documents. Nonetheless, some field research components are present, given the proximity of the author to the research topic.
- Retrospective because it analyses all documents to understand what has happened in the past. Notwithstanding, at the discussion and the conclusion of this paper, some prospective components are present since some insights of the future of the migration crisis are presented, although it is not enough to affirm this paper has prospective objectives.

### **3.3 Methodological Components**

Methodological components define the different layers of analysis chosen for the development of the research. In practical terms, it represents how a general context tapers gradually and affects a specific research topic (or unity of analysis, more accurately), offering a comprehensive perspective and guiding as a roadmap. In other words, it gives perspective and guarantees a smooth understanding of the relation between macro and micro matters in hand. For this case study, the cut-outs resulted in the methodological components below:




FIGURE 3 – Methodological components.

Source: elaborated by the author.

### 3.3.1 Research Context: Crisis, Underdevelopment, and Resilience

The first methodological component is the research context, a vast and broad perspective around the set of factors that affect the topic; although it constitutes a fundamental part of the social phenomena studied, it is not the focus of the paper.

At the same time, the core analysis of this paper will be more related to management concepts; the social and economic deterioration of Venezuela will always surround the discussion since it undeniably acts as the catalyst of the humanitarian crisis. This way, the research context embraces the following closely related concepts: crisis, underdevelopment, and resilience; all of these in relation to the humanitarian crisis of Venezuelan migrants.

Nevertheless, solid methodological components allow us to transit smoothly between general (macro) to specific (micro) questions. This way, some findings on any side of the spectrum may produce powerful insights on the other side, contributing to the complete understanding of a topic. With all that in mind, after the results and discussion of the main findings, the conclusion will briefly give some insights about the macro scenario of the humanitarian crisis and the research context itself.

### 3.3.2 Case: United Nations and humanitarian aid

Many are the actors involved in response to the humanitarian crisis, recalling that it is not limited to the national territory of Venezuela. Many countries receive Venezuelan refugees and asylum seekers, contribute with funding and human resources, among other strategies, to diminish the impacts of the crisis. Institutions are also part of this, including international organizations such as the United Nations, the central and most known multilateral body worldwide.

The second methodological component – the case of this research – gives us an essential cutout: the actor or group of actors analyzed, the United Nations System, comprising its agencies, funds, and programs, also known by the initials AFPs. The UN institutional ecosystem is complex and needs a proper introduction, explanatory information, and clarification. It will be essential to build a solid ground to the path that will be routed, helping to understand the following methodological components in depth.

### 3.3.3 Object: United Nations Agencies, Funds, and Programmes involved in the humanitarian response in Brazil

The third methodological component – the research object – applies a slight filter over the research case, yet fundamental to the development of a solid, linear, and smooth narrative to present the results of this paper.

The UN System globally is composed of many AFPs covering an enormous variety of topics, which are anchored and escorted by their respective mandates – rooted on international agreements and resolutions. Naturally, not all UN AFPs have mandates closely related to humanitarian matters or have their activities in line with it; to the same extent, not all UN AFPs present in Brazil respond to the humanitarian crisis of Venezuelan migrants. It is important to mention that it is not necessarily harmful as it may seem at first reading, and an investigation over its causes and consequences must be conducted to find any conclusion.

The cutout represented by this methodological component tackles this question, which is vital because it will guide the beginning of data collection and the first results in the next chapter. In this sense and as the theoretical review mentioned general directives as to the first step for an



effective Crisis Management, global directives and the mandates of UN institutions shall be used in order to identify which agencies, funds, and programs are these.

Also, it defines the geographical location focus of the research.

### 3.3.4 Focus: Crisis Management (CM) of United Nations Agencies, Funds, and Programmes in response to the humanitarian crisis in Brazil

The following methodological component gives the cutout that defines this research as part of management and administration: how UNF AFPs manage the crisis.

During the theoretical review, it was shown that Crisis Management (CM) constitutes a field of study within the broad field of management. It has specific characteristics, features, and dynamics that require appropriate management measures that should be administered in order to guarantee effectiveness and compliance with affected populations and people in need. Nonetheless, the time element is even more crucial in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, reinforcing the need for a great domain of CM techniques by leaders and managers in charge. As said in the second methodological component (case), many are the actors with which these same leaders will have to deal. So CM directs much attention to the relation between institutions and their interaction. This brings us to the most central methodological component: the unit of analysis.

### 3.3.5 Unit of Analysis: Collaborative Crisis Management (CCM)

The unit of analysis constitutes the core of the case study and the central cut-out, where all various broad matters contribute to the better understanding of a central micro-questions (YIN, 1994). As methodological components functions as different layers, the unit of analysis unite all of them; therefore, the unit of analysis can be fully read as Collaborative Crisis Management (CCM) within United Nations agencies, funds, and programs involved with the response to the humanitarian crisis in Brazil at the light of international development and social resilience.

Throughout the theoretical review, different degrees of institutional interaction were presented in a gradually growing scale of complexity: communication, coordination, cooperation, and collaboration. Taking collaboration within CM, Collaborative Crisis Management arises: a contemporary and breaking concept that has shown much room for knowledge generation.

Collaborative Crisis Management (CCM) is in the frontier of knowledge and state of the art of not only Crisis Management (CM) but Management itself. Given that CCM aggregates the latest tendencies in management and minimal work has been developed about it (especially in the context of humanitarian crisis), it may compromise the objectiveness and assertiveness of the analysis. Possible to affirm that this paper will not be able to rely on quantitative methods, at least in direct connection with the mobilized theory, considering information already gathered in the theoretical review. Some alternative creative analysis may be used taking advantage of the adaptability of the research strategy, case study.

### **3.4 Data collection, processing, and analysis**

Data collection may be performed by a variety of methods and categories of data sources; Robert Yin defends that the following sources complement each other and may be applied to a different extent depending on the case study: documentation, archive register, interviews, direct observation, participative observation, and physical artifacts (YIN, 1994, p. 98).

Regarding documentation and its usage as an investigation tool, Yin (1994) affirms that it should act to validate data. It assists the research in the understanding of a topic, although it should not be given as a "written fact". Contradictions between documents consulted and other data sources should encourage the researcher to dive deeper into a question to clarify it. Rather than solid truth, it should drive questioning - a primary characteristic of a case study researcher, as already presented in this chapter. A great advantage is that it is a stale source of information that holds a wide variety of references, officially records many events. Nevertheless, documentation can be withheld (deliberately or not), affecting the results and representing a knowledge gap. This would require the ability of the researcher to make other relations and creativity to find it by other means.

Archival records – different from documentation – are working documents that become available for the use of the researcher (YIN, 1994). Not all archival records need to be for internal use only and can be made available to the public as a matter of convenience and depending on the organization/institution/group. Yin (1994) already forecasts the difficulty of access to this source of information due to the privacy and security of organizations.

Physical artifacts will comprise the analysis of physical evidence to help in the understanding of social relations, culture, and interaction. Case studies that most benefit from the use of physical artifacts are in the field of anthropology (YIN, 1994).

Interviews are pointed by Robert Yin (1994) as the primary source of data in a case study. Considering that a case study will be directed to research objects related to social questions, it is essential to consult social actors about the facts and sometimes have their opinion and direct contributions. With the inputs of an "insider," the researcher is given a powerful tool to understand in-depth complex social phenomena. Rather than collecting objective and direct answers to the questions made during an interview, the ideal is to create an environment in which the respondent is free to give all information considered relevant to the research topic. Full interviews - around 1 hour long - are more likely to fit this paper, given interviewees are expected to have a short amount of time to contribute to the research - especially when it comes to senior and high-rank officials. This will require from the interviewer competencies similar to the ones of great journalists; able to identify potential areas of interest and even suspect excess of similar information coming from the same group. Nevertheless, the weight of personal opinions and human memory susceptible to failure are important red flags (YIN, 1994).

Direct observation is a data collection helpful technique when the researcher can be physically present in the context and object being studied. This allows the researcher to be in direct contact with relevant information, complementing other sources of information put together by other actors (subjected to their own "filters") (YIN, 1994). When it comes to participative observation, it relies on the same principles of direct observation; both are closely related and, many times, implemented together. Participative observation is not only a great technique to collect valuable information, but it is the main reason that defines a case study as the ideal research strategy for this paper (YIN, 1994).

Notwithstanding, bias should always be at the center of attention, and the researcher should be able to identify it or tend to find other ways to double-check the information to guarantee the reliability of the results (YIN, 1994). Not necessarily bias should be "resolved" or "excluded", but whenever necessary, it should be pointed out and communicated so the audience and other researchers can make the best judgment over the content.

Considering the author of this paper currently works in a UN AFP in Brazil and has worked in another in the past, some natural advantages may be attributed to the position occupied by the

researcher; a high degree of involvement with the object of the study. However, it is important to acknowledge that although the author is part of the UN, the institution has strict rules about the use of insider information. For this same reason, archive registers will be the primary data collection technique for this paper and will be keen to understand how institutional structures respond and adapted in the context of the migration crisis. In this sense, and to correspond to the deadlines to the submission of this paper, only public information will be utilized, mainly collected on the internet in the websites of UN AFPs, NGOs, governmental institutions, among others. As a natural consequence, no interviews and physical artifacts were part of this research; only archive registers of the public domain were consulted. Also, necessary to recall that all information shown in this paper reflects only the view of the author and does not represent the position of UN AFPs in any way.

### 3.5 Analytical Map for Data Collection

The analytical map below offers a detailed breakdown of how the information will be collected and analyzed concerning fundamental concepts presented in the theoretical review. The scales of the analytical map are: the methodological component, the key concept, analytical category, method of collection, source of information, information registry, and analysis.

Methodological Component	Key Concept	Analytical Category	Method of collection	Source of Information	Registry of information/data
<b>RESEARCH CONTEXT</b>  Crisis, Underdevelopment, and Resilience	Underdevelopment	Crisis			Although it constitutes a fundamental part of all matters in hand, results and discussion will not focus on the research context; therefore, it is not part of data collection.
		Vulnerability and Resilience			
		Institutional failure and institutional building			
		Poverty and Prosperity			

<b>CASE</b>  United Nations and humanitarian aid	United Nations System	The mandate of each institution	Retrieval of public documents.	International agreements on the mandate of each UN AFP.	Mendeley (reference management software).
	International humanitarian response system	Global directives	Retrieval of public documents.	International agreements, global directives, and guidance documents.	
<b>OBJECT</b>  United Nations AFPs involved with the humanitarian response in Brazil	Management	Funding	Retrieval of public documents.	Websites of UN AFPs, with a focus on the R4V platform.	Mendeley (reference management software).
		Accountability lines	Retrieval of public documents.	Global directives and guidance documents.	
		Geographical presence	Retrieval of public documents.	Websites of UN AFPs, with a focus on national domains maintained by Country Offices.	
<b>FOCUS</b>  Crisis Management (CM) of United Nations AFPs in response to the humanitarian crisis in Brazil	Crisis Management	Classification of institutions responding to a crisis	Retrieval of public documents.	Websites of UN AFPs, with a focus on national domains maintained by Country Offices.	Mendeley (reference management software).
		Flexibility			
		Effective flow of information			

		Possibilities of inter-organizational relationship (Communication, Coordination, Cooperation, Collaboration)			
<b>UNIT OF ANALYSIS</b>  <b>Collaborative Crisis Management (CCM)</b>	Collaborative Crisis Management (CCM)	Cost of interaction	Retrieval of public documents.	Websites of UN AFPs, with a focus on the R4V platform, using formal and principal evaluations as a reliable source of already-existing analysis.	Mendeley (reference management software).
		Degree of embeddedness			
		Following of common goals			
		Frequency of interaction			
		Reciprocity			
		Shared resources			
		Shared risk			

FIGURE 4 – Analytical map.

Source: elaborated by the author.

## **4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

Recalling the theoretical framework (Chapter 2) and following the same logic proposed in the methodological components and layers of analysis (Chapter 3), results will be displayed from global to local perspectives.

This chapter begins with the international humanitarian response system organization and mentions which institutions are expected to respond to the global crisis according to formal plans, afterward comparing to the institutions that are responding to the migration crisis of Venezuelans in Brazil according to official public information. In a second moment, the presence of these institutions in Brazil and their contributions to the migration response is described. Finally, it analyses which kind of interaction between institutions is observed and if collaborative arrangements and methods exist.

Essential to have an initial note about which institutions will be mentioned: as the United Nations interact with a variety of external actors, it necessary to sometimes briefly mention how those interact with the UN and with the UN interinstitutional/interagency environment. Recalling the classification of institutions responding to a crisis as presented in Chapter 2 (established, extending, expanding, and emerging), the UN is part of expanding organizations. Nonetheless, other organizations from the same category will be mentioned to offer a comparison and idea of proportion regarding the UN's leverage in the group, although not in-depth.

### **4.1 The International Humanitarian Response System and the Cluster Approach**

The United Nations (UN) system is broad and complex. It operates in 3 different levels: global and country-level; regional offices are in place for supporting functions. The UN brings together an enormous variety of topics that are relevant to the world. Its mandate is extensive, and so it is the number of UN agencies, funds, and programs (or UN AFPs), which are the internal mechanisms responsible for covering each specific area. From a business perspective, it would be some kind of conglomerate organizational structure composed of subsidiary bodies operating independently, although still cohesive, effective and coordinated.

At the global level, the UN is led by its Secretary-General (UNSG), followed by heads of UN AFP. (UNITED NATIONS, 2021) The summary of the United Nations system can be better understood with Annex A, the organizational chart.

UN presence at the country level is led by the Resident Coordinator (RC), a senior high-rank officer whose primary responsibility is to represent the UN and coordinate efforts of UN agencies, funds, and programs in a location. The RC acts as the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) chairperson, the group of Representatives of UN AFPs in the country. When humanitarian assistance is needed, the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) may deploy a different professional to work as Humanitarian Coordinator, or the Resident Coordinator may also work also as Humanitarian Coordinator (UNSDG, 2019). The Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator, with all representatives of Cluster Lead Agencies (this will be explained just ahead) and representatives of UN AFPs and invited NGOs, form the Country Team or the Humanitarian County Team – depending on the humanitarian situation in the country. Figure 5 exposes the IASC international humanitarian architecture, including reporting lines and coordination lines (note that these are not necessarily the same),

In 1991 the United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution that opened the way to coordination between international humanitarian response and relief organizations. It required the establishment of prevention and preparedness measures, stand-by capacity to guarantee response at early stages of emergencies (measures for rapid response and contingency funding), response led at country-level through the Resident Coordinator system (described below), and also states that appeals should unify the needs of all organizations of the humanitarian response system. This resolution created the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), formed by UN and non-UN organizations relevant to the delivery of adequate humanitarian assistance (UNITED NATIONS, 1991). It is important to notice the attention that funding receives in the resolution, willing to prevent the international humanitarian response system from being obstructed by lack of financial resources, mainly during early stages of emergencies where immediate action is required and time is at its most critical moment as a critical factor.

Following a series of consultations and evaluations of the international humanitarian response system, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee developed the Cluster Approach. It aims to decrease improvised arrangements and lack of professionalism in the international humanitarian



response system, ensuring effectiveness to guarantee accountability to affected populations and people in need (IASC, 2015)

The Cluster Approach establishes lead humanitarian organizations of the international humanitarian response system: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Save the Children, World Food Programme (WFP), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Health Organization (WHO) and International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) (IASC, 2015). A brief explanation of the mandate of each organization and their response to the influx of Venezuelans in Brazil will be provided further in this paper. These organizations would be responsible for a different area of expertise; all these areas compose a complete humanitarian crisis response system with transparent reporting and accountability lines.




FIGURE 5 – IASC Humanitarian Coordination Architecture.

Source: IASC, 2010.




FIGURE 6 – Cluster lead agencies by sector.

Source: IASC, 2015.

The Cluster Approach was assessed by two evaluations. The first was conducted in 2007 by an independent professional evaluation team. It concluded that the strategy made valuable contributions to the international humanitarian response system and its ability to act more integrated and with unity as it was initially aimed. On the other hand, it identified much fragility and space for improvement. It marked leadership as an important topic of concern, requiring more training and preparation for Resident/Humanitarian Coordinators about the strategy itself. Also, it concluded that in the first two years of implementation, UN cluster lead agencies had yet to institutionalize the Cluster Approach into their operations to have it as a solid and determinant institutional strategy. The general impression was that it served much more as a mandatory system in which relevance was weakly recognized in the field, and by most humanitarian staff, it needed to get involved. Anyhow, the research team mainly collected positive comments of actors involved in the Cluster Approach implementation and recommended its continuity and constant

development towards an improved humanitarian crisis response strategy. The evaluation summarized the general opinion in the following quote: "effective humanitarian response is too important to be left to goodwill and the right assortment of personalities" (STODDARD et al., 2007, p. 45).

In respect to the comments of the evaluation around leadership, it was somewhat directed to the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator system. Combining both the position of the Resident Coordinator and the Humanitarian Coordinator, deploying only one professional may bring benefits to the humanitarian response. This way, it is expected to have more precise reporting lines and a better flow of information. This configuration "pits the need for strong humanitarian credentials and independent authority against the need to maintain strong working relations with government counterparts" (STODDARD et al., 2007, p. 43).

The potential for mutually beneficial interactions between the cluster approach and the Humanitarian Coordinator system remains largely unexplored. Interactions between clusters and financing mechanisms to date are mostly strongly positive, but negative examples highlight substantial risks when clusters and funding mechanisms are too closely intertwined. (STREETS et al., 2010, p. 39)

The second evaluation of the Cluster Approach was released in 2010. As well in the 2007 evaluation, 2010 evaluation mentioned the lack of managerial capacity and training of cluster coordinators. It mentioned the need to raise financial resources to allow better coverage, although it may cause tension among actors. Also, it recognized that some improvement was observed, resulting in better leadership, especially in relation to coordination abilities and competencies. The typical response to priority gaps and improvement areas is mentioned as a significant aspect of the implementation of the strategy, which clusters lead agencies use to reassess the results and jointly foster solutions. As a significant risk, the second evaluation of the cluster approach reinforces that effectiveness may be compromised if managerial capacities and coordination/collaboration is not used as intended, at the cost of aggravating the delicate situation of affected populations. (STREETS et al., 2010).

According to OCHA, both independent evaluations provided major inputs to the Transformative Agenda (OCHA, 2020).

## 4.2 Cluster lead agencies and their presence in Brazil

As forecasted by CM theory, general norms exist to facilitate planning and immediate response, which can be reviewed and adjusted depending on the specific situation at hand.

Table 4 compares which are the Cluster lead agencies according to the Cluster Approach and which institutions, in fact, are acting to respond to the humanitarian crisis in Brazil. Table 4 was formulated with the information in the last 5W Report from the R4V Platform, dated from May 2020 (R4V), divided by areas of interest/action/accountability.

Worth mentioning that the document made no direct mentioning of the Cluster Approach original structure. The following clusters are not mentioned: early recovery, emergency telecommunications, and logistics. At the same time, new activity areas are mentioned, therefore new clusters: child protection, human trafficking, humanitarian transportation, and non-food items. Albeit not clear, there is strong evidence leading to the understanding that the UN System had reorganized the Cluster basic structure to respond to this humanitarian crisis. (R4V, 2020)

Relevant to mention that many of these same cluster activities are also performed by the Brazilian government to a considerable extent through "Operação Acolhida"; it acts as a task force working in the following fronts: border control, refuge, and interiorization. (BRAZIL, 2021)

**TABLE 4**

Comparative table between lead organizations as cluster approach plan and actual organizations responding.

<b>Cluster</b>	<b>Lead organizations according to the Cluster Approach plan</b>	<b>Organizations responding</b>
<b>Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM)</b>	UNHCR IOM	UNHCR
<b>Child Protection</b>	-	UNHCR Cáritas Arquidiocesana do Rio de Janeiro UNICEF
<b>Early Recovery</b>	UNDP	Not possible to identify
<b>Education</b>	UNICEF Save the Children	UNHCR Cáritas Suíça no Brasil

		UNICEF World Vision
<b>Emergency Telecommunications</b>	WFP	Not possible to identify
<b>Food Security</b>	WFP FAO	UNHCR ASAV Brazil Cáritas Arquidiocesana do Rio de Janeiro Cáritas Suíça no Brasil IKMR IMDH IOM
<b>Health</b>	WHO	ASAV Brazil Cáritas Arquidiocesana do Rio de Janeiro IOM UNICEF
<b>Human Trafficking</b>	-	IOM
<b>Humanitarian Transportation</b>	-	UNHCR ASAB Brazil IOM
<b>Logistics</b>	WFP	Not possible to identify
<b>Non-Food Items</b>	-	UNHCR ASAV Brazil Cáritas Arquidiocesana do Rio de Janeiro Cáritas Suíça no Brasil IKMR IMDH IOM UNFPA World Vision
<b>Nutrition</b>	UNICEF	UNICEF
<b>Protection</b>	UNHCR	UNHCR Cáritas Arquidiocesana do Rio de Janeiro Cáritas Suíça no Brasil IOM
<b>Shelter</b>	UNHCR IFRC	UNHCR Cáritas Arquidiocesana do Rio de Janeiro Cáritas Suíça no Brasil IKMR

		IOM
<b>Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH)</b>	UNICEF	UNICEF

Source: elaborated by the author; R4V, 2020; UNICEF, 2021.

In fact, the R4V 5W Report (Who does What, Where, When, and for Whom) mentioned previously is a direct response of the team to the recommendations of the second evaluation of the Cluster Approach (2010). Initially, “Who does What Where” (3W), the information management tool used by OCHA to include simple – although critical – information, suffered slight adaptation to include “when” and “for whom” indicators. Among key findings of the evaluation, the 3W was described as having insufficient information to influence the decision in the field, recommending adding “when and how”. Through better information sharing, clusters may “become more effective and efficient in their operations by improving their management and implementation modalities” (STREETS et al., 2010, p. 80).

The operational complexity of each cluster has an uncountable number of variants. They are inspired by the information provided in the R4V 5W Report (Who does What, Where and for Whom), three key variants were selected and combined below, illustrating operational complexity: number of implementing partners, number of beneficiaries (in thousands), and locations where activities were taking place. Selected reports are from February 2020 (last month before the first reported case of COVID in Brazil) and from July 2020 (last R4V 5W Report available on the website) to offer a comparison between pre-COVID and post-COVID scenarios.

As it can be observed in Figure 8, most clusters reduced their complexity during the COVID-19 pandemic, with a highlight to the Protection Cluster – a more significant variation among all. Most clusters that observed an increased complexity during the pandemic have a direct relation to the sanitary emergency, like Health, Nutrition, and WASH (water, sanitation, and hygiene) (R4V, 2020). Important to note that this is closely related to the closure of Brazilian borders due to the pandemic. From March 2020 until April 2021 (date of finalization of this paper), if no individual exception was granted, Venezuelan migrants and refugees only enter the Brazilian territory irregularly. (UNHCR, 2021)

When it comes to the disastrous mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic in Brazil, it represents a severe impact on Venezuelan migrants. Closed borders affect all migrants’ access to

fundamental rights and seek assistance, even if not directly affected and contaminated by SARS-COV-2.

The pandemic in Brazil entered its worst stage so far, with a daily death toll averaging 3,000 by end-March, while the government worked to ensure a steady flow of vaccines as part of its immunization schedule. Several state healthcare systems were reported to be at maximum capacity or already collapsed, with ICU occupation rates above 90 percent, and the border remained closed at Pacaraima for the month of March. Bolivia also closed its border with Brazil; Argentina suspended all flights from Brazil, Chile, and Mexico out of fears of a “second wave”; Uruguay noted a rise in COVID-19 cases linked to the identification of the Brazilian strain in 7 departments of the country; and the case rate soared in Paraguay, with the health system under strain, although its borders remained open albeit with stricter implementation of entry requirements, and new movement restrictions enacted on 27 March. [...] Increased military forces along borders in Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, and Chile impeded access to territory and protection for Venezuelans fleeing their country. [...] At the end of March, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) called on governments to maintain a human rights approach to border management. (R4V, 2021, p.1)

Nevertheless, Venezuelan migrants already in the Brazilian territory still face relevant challenges in the recognition and access to fundamental rights.

In Brazil, rising numbers of homeless and undocumented Venezuelans in Boa Vista prompted the reactivation of the Nova Canaã shelter to receive members of indigenous populations in an effort coordinated between R4V partners and the Government-led Operation Welcome. Meanwhile, the BV8 Transit Centre, which shelters newly arrived vulnerable individuals, reached its capacity of 1,000 persons in February. R4V partners also installed Refugee Housing Units (RHUs) and set up a COVID-19 isolation area at the 13 de Setembro Emergency Site in Boa Vista, Roraima. (R4V, 2021, p.1)




FIGURE 7 – Operational complexity of each cluster according to 3 selected variants, before and during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Source: elaborated by the author; R4V, 2020.



In addition, according to the R4V Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan for 2021 and as illustrated in figure 7, 71% of all financial resources required in the plan are expected to be mobilized by UN agencies, funds, and programs, 23% by international NGOs related to religious groups, other categories of institutions summed up 6% (international NGOs not related to religious groups, national social organizations related or not to religious groups, and social movements) (R4V, 2020). It reiterates the leading role played by UN AFPs, mainly UNHCR, IOM, and UNICEF. Each AFP has its funding mechanisms (compulsory/mandatory donations from member states, individual donations, and private partnerships), representing the ability of the UN to mobilize resources, deliver humanitarian assistance, and implement programs.




FIGURE 6 – Financial requirements by organization for the year 2021.

Source: elaborated by the author; R4V, 2020.

In October 2020, the UNCT in Brazil was formed by 29 members: The Resident Coordinator Ad Interim Marlova Jovchelovitch Noletto, an RC Office Team Leader, a Programme Communications and Advocacy Officer, and 26 UN AFPs Representatives. Refer to Appendix A to a complete list of UNCT members – including AFP name, name of Representative, and official position name – as of April 2021. It is noted that only one organization had an interim representative. Also, it is noted that the representative of UNDRR for the UNCT in Brazil acts mainly as the Regional Director of the organization (UNDG, 2020).

Most UN agencies, funds, and programs have a central and national office in Brasília, the capital; some of these offices are in the UN House, the iconic UN building in Brazil. It hosts nine

different bodies: The Resident Coordinator Office, UNDP, UNV, UNDSS, Montreal Protocol, UNAIDS, UNFPA, UN Woman, and UN Environment (EXAME, 2011; ONU MULHERES, 2015). In 2015, approximately 200 staff worked on-site (UNAIDS BRASIL, 2015). Other offices are installed in other locations depending on the specific operational and programmatic needs of each body.



FIGURE 9 – United Nations House in Brazil (Brasília, Federal District).

Source: United Nations Information Center, 2020.

The Cluster Approach was established with respect to the core abilities of UN AFPs and other international organizations; therefore, having a clear look at its mandates is critical to understand their roles in the international crisis response system; to follow the mandate and briefly expose cluster lead agencies presence in Brazil this will be presented from this point on.

#### 4.2.1 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

In December 1949, the UN General Assembly approved a resolution for the creation of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, beginning operations on 1 January 1951. It recognized that a refugee situation should be addressed by whether the “voluntary repatriation” of the individual or its refuge in a country other than its origin. Also, it mentions the critical role the UN occupies within the international community to protect refugees. Its creation was subjected to

an assessment by the end of 1953 to decide whether to renew the UNHCR mandate for a more extended period or not (UNITED NATIONS, 1949). Although the UN is formed by governments and naturally interact with their political views, the UNHCR Statute affirms that “the work of the High Commissioner shall be of an entirely non-political character; it shall be humanitarian and social and shall relate, as a rule, to groups and categories of refugees”. It also recalls that all activities are subjected to the approval and cooperation of the country of concern (UNITED NATIONS, 1950, p.46). In the same year, UNHCR began its operations, the international Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was approved, reaffirming key roles to be performed by the High Commissioner before the international community and establishing the groundbreaking standard definition of a refugee (UNITED NATIONS, 1951).

UNHCR is present in Brazil since 1982 (UNHCR, 2021). It has a national office in Brasília, supported by subnational offices in São Paulo, São Paulo; Manaus, Amazonas; and Boa Vista, Roraima (UNHCR, 2021).

According to recent vacancy announcements, UNHCR has recently established a Private Sector Partnership Unit with the aim to raise and mobilize funds from private institutions to the migration response. The institution is seeking even more funding and organizing its institutional structure to observe growth in private funds by 2025. This illustrates that the institution is interested in not only keeping active but growing its activities in the context of the migration crisis in Brazil.<sup>7</sup>

According to the Cluster Approach, UNHCR is responsible for the following clusters: Camp Coordination and Camp Management cluster (in conjunction with IOM), Protection, and Shelter (in conjunction with IFRC).

#### 4.2.2 International Organization for Migration (IOM)

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has worked since 1951 in order to guarantee a human rights-based approach to migration. It is an international organization with 173 member states, working across the world with key actors to accomplish its mandate (IOM, 2020). IOM is internally organized to cover a variety of relevant topics in the field of migration: “labor and facilitated migration, migration and development, counter-trafficking, assisted voluntary

---

<sup>7</sup> Information taken from the Vacancy Notice for Private Sector Partnership Officer at UNHCR Brazil (2020).

return, migration health, assistance for vulnerable migrants, immigration and border management and overall capacity-building in migration management”. Climate change and its relation to migration is also a topic covered by IOM (IOM, 2020). Regarding what it might appear, IOM was not part of the United Nations until 2016; IOM became one of its specialized agencies following the unanimous approval of the UN General Assembly (IOM, 2016).

According to the Cluster Approach, the International Organization for Migration is responsible for the cluster of Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) in conjunction with UNHCR.

Dialogue between the government of Brazil and IOM in order to begin international cooperation started only in 2004. OIM opened its first office in the country in 2016, in Brasília, where it coordinates action in other 11 cities it is present: Belém, Belo Horizonte, Boa Vista, Curitiba, Florianópolis, Manaus, Pacaraima, Porto Alegre, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo. According to information from 2020, OIM has more than 160 staff working in Brazil (IOM, 2020).

#### 4.2.3 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was created on 22 November 1965 by the agglutination of the already existing Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance for Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries and the Special Fund. The Expanded Programme's full name by itself explains its mandate; the Special Fund was established to congregate resources to urgent and large development projects. The agglutination aimed to simplify and strengthen efforts of the UN to the assistance of underdeveloped countries and contribute to their growth. Rearranging these structures into a unified body was considered keen to the effective delivery of development programs and leveraging fundraising at the same time (UNITED NATIONS, 1958; UNITED NATIONS, 1965).

UNDP has a national office in Brasília and subnational offices in five cities in Brazil: Salvador, São Paulo, Teresina, and Belém. UNDP actions in the country are guided by a Programme Document - PD approved by its Executive Board at Headquarters and the government of Brazil. It is active for cycles of 5 years, actually for the period 2017-2021. Its priorities are:

“People: inclusive and equitable society with extensive rights for all men and women. [...] Planet: sustainable management of natural resources for present and future generations. [...] Prosperity: prosperity and quality of life for everyone. [...] Peace: peaceful, fair and inclusive society”  
(UNITED NATIONS, 2016)

According to the Cluster Approach, the United Nations Development Programme is responsible for the cluster of Early Recovery. [participation in the migration response]

#### 4.2.4 United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

Responding to a request made by the UN Economic and Social Council, the UN General Assembly approved a resolution establishing the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) on 11 December 1946. In the context of the post-Second World War, the resolution takes notice of the urgent need for relief work for children, adolescents, and their mothers. The emergency fund would congregate all resources voluntarily made available by the government, institutions, individuals, and any other potential donor. Activities performed by the fund in a country shall occur in a joint agreement with its governmental authority (UNITED NATIONS, 1946). Initially, it worked on countries' victims of aggression during the war, but four years later, its mandate was extended to cover children, adolescents, and mothers worldwide (UNITED NATIONS, 1950). On 6 October 1953, the UNGA recognized its valuable contributions made by the emergency fund to the overall situation of children and decided to make it a permanent entity of the UN system. Its name changed to United Nations Children’s Fund, although maintaining the acronym UNICEF (UNITED NATIONS, 1953).

In Brazil, UNICEF national office is installed in Brasília, the capital; it has zone offices in 9 cities: Belém, Boa Vista, Fortaleza, Manaus, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, São Luís, São Paulo. Those offices are responsible for the development of projects in near states: UNICEF covers 22 of the 26 Brazil federative units. The organization has the following institutional division: communications and partnerships, private fundraising and partnerships, social policy, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), education, health and HIV/AIDS, child protection, and adolescents and youth participation (UNICEF, 2021).

According to the Cluster Approach, the United Nations Children’s Fund is responsible for the following clusters: Education (in conjunction with Save the Children), Nutrition, and WASH.

#### 4.2.5 Save the Children

Save the Children is an international non-governmental organization (NGO) focused on safeguarding child rights with a strong presence in response to humanitarian emergencies worldwide. It focuses on survival, learning, and protection of children from violence; its mission is “to inspire breakthroughs in the way the world treats children and achieve immediate and lasting change in their lives” (SAVE THE CHILDREN, 2019).

Save the Children is responsible for the Education cluster (in conjunction with UNICEF) according to the Cluster Approach plan. It was not possible to find reliable information that confirms its presence in Brazil since its global website has conflicting information. Although it affirms that Save the Children has been working in the fields of children survival, education, and emergency response in Brazil since 1991, the country is not listed in the updated list of programmatic locations. The list mentions only three countries of South America where programs are implemented: Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. Also, no information was found regarding the deployment of any financial resource from Save the Children in the country; neither was found a dedicated website of the organization to Brazil (SAVE THE CHILDREN, 2021). This information was confirmed in consultation with a UN national officer and with a consultant, both directly involved with the response to the migration crisis.

#### 4.2.6 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) was created on 16 October 1945 as a result of the international preoccupation with food and starvation caused by the mass destruction of the Second World War. FAO is a specialized agency part of the UN system and is entitled to work on all necessary fronts to enhance the wealth of people through good nutrition and the efficient delivery of food to populations in need (FAO, 2020).

FAO is present in Brazil since 1949; it has a national office in Brasília and a decentralized unit in Curitiba dedicated to project management and proximity with relevant actors of the south

region of Brazil (FAO, 2021). Although the Food and Agriculture Organization is responsible for the cluster of Food and Security (in conjunction with WFP), no information was identified in its website nor UN Brazil website regarding programmatic action to respond to the influx of Venezuelan migrants in Brazil.

#### 4.2.7 World Food Programme (WFP)

The World Food Programme (WFP) was established by the UN General Assembly on 19 December 1961 as a pilot project of, initially, three years between the UN and FAO. Its main objective was to deliver food worldwide as part of humanitarian aid efforts to fight hunger and malnutrition (UNITED NATIONS, 1961). WFP was renewed in 1965, being now a continuing entity of the UN system with its mandate, activities, and need to be reassessed regularly (UNITED NATIONS, 1965). In 2020, WFP was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize “for its efforts to combat hunger, for its contribution to bettering conditions for peace in conflict-affected areas and for acting as a driving force in efforts to prevent the use of hunger as a weapon of war and conflict” (NOBEL MEDIA AB, 2020).

WFP national office is in Brasília, the capital, and is a Centre of Excellence against Hunger. It facilitates international public policy dialogue through the Trilateral South-South Cooperation strategy<sup>8</sup>, focusing on specific needs to combat hunger in Africa, Latin America, and Asia (WFP, 2021). According to the Cluster Approach plan, the World Food Programme is responsible for the following clusters: Emergency Telecommunications, Food Security (in conjunction with FAO), and Logistics. Despite this, no information was found on the Brazilian website of the institution (2021) and the last R4V 5W Report (Who does What Where, When, and for Whom) from May 2020 regarding any WFP programmatic participation or implementation in the context of the Venezuelan migrant crisis in Brazil.

---

<sup>8</sup> Through South-South Cooperation two or more developing countries interact in the aim to fulfill a certain objective, using a variety of available resources (financial, knowledge, specialized personnel, etc) and calling for the participation of key actors/institutions. Trilateral South-South Cooperation happens when this dialogue and interaction is facilitated by a third party external to the scenario just described, therefore an international organization or developed country (UNICEF, 2021).

#### 4.2.8 World Health Organization (WHO)

In 1903, the idea of the first permanent international health organization appeared during the International Sanitary Conference of that year. The International Office of Public Health started functioning in 1908. When the League of Nations - an international organization predecessor to the UN - was created after the First World War, a second international health organization was created, and both contributed with each other. After the end of the Second World War, representatives from Brazil and China once again brought to the attention the need to create a unified international health organization (WHO, 2020). On 22 June 1946, UN member states agreed on the Constitution of the World Health Organization, which defined the modern concept of health as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity” (WHO, 1946, p.1). The Constitution also established a series of responsibilities of national authorities, spaces for specialized and technical international cooperation. The WHO hosts a session of the World Health Assembly annually, when decisions regarding the positioning of WHO are adopted and conventions and agreements are firmed, among other activities that contribute to world health (WHO, 1946).

WHO is installed in Brasília, and its office also acts as a regional office to the Americas. It also congregates PAHO, the Pan-American Health Organization, an international health organization focused on the Americas and part of the UN System as well (OPAS, 2021).

According to the Cluster Approach plan, the World Health Organization is responsible for the Health cluster.

#### 4.2.9 International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)

The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) is an organization that acts “in response to emergencies and at the same time promotes respect for international humanitarian law and its implementation in national law”. The IFRC is not a single organization; it is formed by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and 191 National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies acting in different countries. All those are united by a series of humanitarian principles and the common goal to assist populations in need of humanitarian assistance (IFRC, 2020).



IFRC has a regional delegation installed in Brasília responsible for institutional presence and support not only in Brazil but in countries of the South Cone: Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay (CICV, 2021).

According to the Cluster Approach plan, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies is responsible for the Shelter cluster (in conjunction with UNHCR).

### **4.3 Collaborative Crisis Management: United Nations response to the influx of Venezuelan migrants in Brazil**

First, and before directly introducing discussion points on collaborative arrangements, we shall deliberate on the phase of the humanitarian crisis. This is because a crisis in an on-set phase will have completely different factors in relation to a crisis that is already heading to its resolution, for instance. Society recovery, for example, is a significant point of attention when reaching crisis off-set, which is not the case for a “still-in-development” crisis. As organizations are constantly responding to external stimuli, their activities will be directly affected by the external scenario.

In this sense, preliminary findings indicate that UN entities progress towards an increase in their humanitarian presence and activities in Brazil. This is demonstrated by the high frequency of job opportunities advertised by UNHCR, IOM, and UNICEF – the 3 UN agencies with the most representative budget requirements for 2021, as per Figure 7. Not only hiring of local professionals seems to observe constancy, but especially those positions to fundraising and donor relations. In fact, multiple terms of reference publicized by these AFPs between 2020 and 2021 directly mention the institutional effort to improve fundraising. For instance, UNHCR’s terms of references often mention its PSP – Private Sector Partnership area, created in 2017 (worth mentioning, the same period of the outbreak of the humanitarian crisis). Although not necessarily all resources raised within Brazil will be utilized locally, no doubt it constitutes strong evidence of the institutional effort to enhance its financial capacities – consequently, also its ability to respond locally.

With this, it is given a clear look around the “institutional momentum” of the UN in Brazil – or tendencies for institutional presence. Studying the response of a complex institutional system such as the UN gives us important hints about the present and future of the humanitarian crisis, also allowing appropriate response measures (and institutional interaction) to the best interest of affected populations. Having the classification of institutions responding to a crisis seen in the

theoretical review recalled, expanding organizations are the first to exit a crisis scene. Their work complements the work of extending organizations – mostly governmental structures – and, as a crisis gets closer to the recovery phase, social services and other relief work are not needed to the same extent as previously in acute phases.

Even though the influx of Venezuelan migrants to Brazil now occurs at a significantly lower rate in comparison to rates of the past few years, the presence of expanding organizations in response to the influx of Venezuelan migrants in Brazil is currently still on the rise. Decreased influx rates are imputed over closed international borders in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic (as mentioned in more depth in subchapter 4.2) and should not be considered as an indicator of the crisis off-set of the crisis. In fact, it acts as a “symptom” of an aggravating factor that is already worsening the humanitarian situation and will have severe consequences on affected populations.

The influx of Venezuelans to Brazil is likely to get back to previous rates – or even increase – once the Brazilian border reopens and formal migration routes are reestablished. Considering all crisis aspects foresaid, it fits what Bynander and Nohrstedt (2020) named “slow-burning crisis”, which is characterized by gradual onset, followed by a subsequent phase that does not develop the crisis to a resolution; instead, it “fades away”. It is a situation in which the crisis has been happening for so long that society gets used to it. However, aid is still keen.

As seen previously, the international humanitarian crisis response system is designed in a way it requires close interaction between institutions (which can be characterized as communication, cooperation, coordination, or collaboration: the 4 Cs), establishing clear accountability lines. The most appropriate interaction degree will be defined in accordance with its context and environment, meaning none is considered a definitive must. Each one of the 4 Cs will require a different allocation of institutional resources (personnel, economic, and infrastructure, for instance) to guarantee its fulfillment. In the field of crisis management and humanitarian assistance – where resources are minimal and, in most cases, insufficient – managing inter-institutional interaction is keen to deliver the most needed aid in the most influential fashion and guarantee accountability to affected populations.

When it comes to the analysis of the degree of interaction among humanitarian institutions, an important fact should be brought to attention: the impermanence of the object being analyzed. In an always-changing environment, depending on the timeframe, different “portraits” of the same object may come as a result. Institutions are constantly reassessing their own operations and

readjusting intra/inter-institutional mechanisms to better respond to external stimulus. This is potentialized during a crisis when time-sensitiveness counts as the primary root for pressure among staff. In this paper, the timeframe of the analysis comprehends the period from 2016 – when the Venezuelan crisis worsened and the influx of Venezuelan migrants began to be more expressive in Brazil – to the first quarter of 2021 – cut-out date for practical research reasons.

Another point for attention is to not fall into the trap of using individual micro-scenarios to characterize the general context. The analytical map has robust and specific cut-outs, but the last (unit of analysis) should be followed to the best of its extent. In this paper, it was made the decision to focus on CCM among UN AFPs involved in response to the influx of Venezuelan migrants in Brazil. For practical methodological guidance, this requires the analysis of national mechanisms of the institutions. If brought to a business administration perspective, the focus would be on strategic and tactic matters, leaving operational aspects. This does not mean operations will not be mentioned, but it does not constitute a central topic; thus, it is mentioned in this paper to demonstrate how strategic and tactic teams act to facilitate operational matters. Such disclaimer is key to avoid methodological mistakes and, consequently, creating precipitate results because of juggling both the broad context and limited/individual/micro cases incorrectly.

That said, we may turn to the analysis of crisis management arrangements and institutional interaction within UN agencies, funds, and programs in Brazil. It will be driven by the discussion around the cost of interaction, degree of embeddedness, following of common goals, frequency of interaction, reciprocity, shared resources, and shared risk – key characteristics of the Four Cs (MARTIN et al., 2016). Therefore, the linear scale of communication, cooperation, coordination, and collaboration will be explored as each component is presented.

Conscious of the unfolding resolution and persisting humanitarian crisis in Venezuela and neighboring countries, the United Nations Secretary-General requested the creation of the Regional Inter-Agency Coordination Platform – R4V (the acronym that stands for “Response for Venezuelans”). R4V represents a milestone for deepening the interaction between cluster lead agencies and, generally, all institutions responding to the migration crisis in Brazil actively. R4V online site contains a wide variety of documents, including assessments, contact lists, COVID-19 related material, real-time dashboards, factsheets, data, statistics, funding numbers and balances, media reports, meeting minutes, national refugee response plans, situation reports and analysis, strategy documents, training materials, among others (R4V, 2021).

“Taking into account participants in the national platforms, more than 170 actors collaborate in this coordinated regional response. They collaborate through several coordination support working groups (on information management, communication/fundraising) and other product-oriented working groups (support spaces, gender based-violence, communication with communities, and integration.” (R4V, 2021)

R4V constantly promotes joint meetings between relevant actors in various areas/topics of concern (R4V, 2021). According to information made available in the R4V platform, on 21<sup>st</sup> June 2020, the 12<sup>th</sup> Regional Platform Meeting happened with 200 different people. During the meeting, different planning scenarios were ventilated for planning purposes, considering which specific impacts would be observed in which case and necessary measures (R4V, 2020). Different organizational levels seem to be involved in activities promoted by R4V, from UN high-rank officials, to AFPs leadership in Brazil, national technical teams, and local staff in the field.

In December 2020, R4V released the Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan covering the year 2021. It establishes general needs and priorities for Venezuelan migrants and refugees in Venezuela and neighboring countries, including Brazil. This plan covers a variety of topics, including background and situation analysis, programmatic activities and priorities by area, populations of concern, funding gaps and needs, and, most important to this paper: the role of partnerships and coordination to accomplish the success of the plan. It listed a total of 158 organizations involved with the migration response in South America; among them are UN AFPs, international organizations, local NGOs, and national committees. Besides not being mentioned, governments are always considered since it is their primary responsibility to assist migrants and refugees according to international humanitarian law (R4V, 2020).

Many hints on the degree of inter-institutional interaction between UN AFPs in Brazil can be taken from R4V documents and how it reports joint activities. In summary, it seems to endorse that most critical characteristics of the Four Cs are present at a high level.

Starting from the following of common goals, it constitutes the most substantial factor identifiable in the R4V platform among Four Cs characteristics, the primary evidence of this being the Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan. It summarizes challenges and indicates how each institution (UN entity or not) will be responsible for delivering humanitarian assistance and

how people in need will be targeted. Having this information organized not only formalizes common goals that should be followed in an objective manner but, most importantly, serves as a roadmap guiding institutional efforts in a scenario of uncertainty. Thus, it facilitates the accomplishment of the mandate of the UN and of each institution.

Following common goals will be closely related to the degree of embeddedness (interinstitutional “stickiness” to proposed strategy and to collective agreements, formal or not). Recalling a point that was just mentioned in the paragraph above, a crisis is a scenario of uncertainty. Consequently, although keen to embrace flexibility, some core aspects of the response shall be solid and not frequently change. It serves as an anchor to humanitarian staff in some way, facilitating overall performance and program implementation. Also, it aims to guarantee that no ineffectiveness will occur because of the lack of management of interinstitutional work. R4V shows strong evidence that embeddedness to common strategies is observed in the context of UN humanitarian activities in Brazil.

As a matter of fact, as most of these institutions are under the umbrella of the UN System and respond to the UN Resident Coordinator in Brazil, it indicates that these same institutions are highly likely to stick to the joint agreements and strategies. Also, national websites of key UN AFPs in Brazil have demonstrated to have monitoring and evaluation activities and dedicated staff to perform these functions. Monitoring and evaluation activities actively look up to the external scenario and analyze it, but also to look to the organization itself and confront targets and results. It is a quality assurance mechanism directly acting over the degree of embeddedness and following of common goals. In this context, no evidence of joint monitoring and evaluation mechanisms – standard M&E services – was identified. As per the available public information, each organization seems to contribute to joint M&E activities through internal already-existing institutional structures and staff.

When it comes to reciprocity among institutions, documents from R4V reinforce that it happens, but to a limited extent. Oxford Languages (2021) online dictionary defines reciprocity as “the practice of exchanging things with others for mutual benefit, especially privileges granted by one country or organization to another.” According to this definition, it is possible to affirm that reciprocity is present in the humanitarian crisis response system developed to and in effect in Brazil. Most benefits brought by UN AFPs are related to the image of the UN and its access to national and international political actors. Also, the UN brings many benefits brought by such a

sizeable institutional structure, such as funding and recognized technical expertise. On the other hand, NGOs and other non-UN institutions tend to act closer to the field and the affected population, holding more knowledge on the operationalization of the humanitarian response. Some of these NGOs are local non-governmental organizations, as shown in Figure 7 (financial requirements by organization for the year of 2021) while representing less than 3% of financial requirements.

Preliminary analysis of the Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan in conjunction with other R4V documents indicates that United Nations AFPs and other R4V partner institutions experience mutual and complimentary benefits due to their joint work; therefore, reciprocity. It seems to be more present at the strategic level (represented by national offices) and those responsible for interacting with regional and global teams rather than at the operational level (field presence).

Risk is a significant point of attention. To illustrate, simple word tracking identified “risk” being mentioned 329 times in the Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan – RRMMP for 2021 (R4V, 2020). For comparison, the version of this strategy for the year 2020 mentioned “risk” 213 times (R4V, 2019), while in the document for 2019 only 55 times (UNHCR, 2018). Although in most cases, risks are mentioned not about operational aspects of institutional activities concerning risks suffered by Venezuelan migrants, it still relates to core functions of these humanitarian organizations. Any risk suffered by Venezuelan migrants as a group also configures a risk to R4V partners and the United Nations System's effectiveness in the field. As per the second evaluation of the Cluster Approach, most risks inflects over joint meetings, allocation of resources, partnerships, financing mechanisms, among other joint actions (STREETS et al., 2010).

The last Four Cs’ factor to be explored with evidence collected in R4V, shared resources. Although the number of shared resources managed jointly is not easily identifiable – since it would require information in the public domain such as accountant classification that is not available –, R4V reveals growing numbers when comparing humanitarian funding over the past years. As a direct result, expected that institutional resources required to manage this funding would grow accordingly. At least, the organization is likely to suffer pressure to do so. Anyhow, still not possible to affirm if resource sharing occurs at a high or low rate. More details around resource-related matters to be mentioned further up when other information will be explored whilst not limited to R4V.

In summary, preliminary analysis of information available in the R4V platform highly tends to indicate collaborative arrangements at the national level (more strategic and political-related). At the same time, it tends to signalize that the operational level represented by UN presence in the field is closer to somewhat between cooperation and coordination.

R4V seems to work mainly as a space for broad information sharing: through the repository of public documents in the website, through official information shared during internal meetings, or even informally through communication lines between staff from different institutions. How this information is used for public and internal use serves as a central topic of analysis to configure which is the degree of interaction between institutions. This is because the flux of information may be architected to stimulate or even require interaction between actors. Also, documents can objectively indicate the intensity of each characteristic of the 4Cs, such as frequency of interaction, shared resources, and following common goals.

Bringing into consideration the second evaluation of the Cluster Approach: “information management and institutional memory remain a big problem” in the international humanitarian response system. It was pointed out as a significant red flag for improvement by evaluators (STREETS et al., 2010). More than ten years later, this matter seems to persist. It was possible to observe an impressive number of documents, meeting notes, and other products, which directly resulted from the coordination mechanisms publicized through the R4V platform. Nevertheless, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the quantity and frequency of uploads decreased. It is not clear if it happened because interactions among R4V partners were affected or simply because documents uploads into the platform could not occur for any other reason. It is apprehensible because, during 2020-21, many humanitarian teams have experienced overworking and difficulties to juggle increased demands – as a direct symptom of the nature of the humanitarian work. Anyhow, it undoubtedly acts as an indicator that the platform experienced difficulties in guaranteeing its continuity and effectiveness, at least in comparison to the pre-COVID period.

A high frequency of interaction is an indicator of collaboration. The irregularity observed in some R4V public updates leaves a question mark whether collaborative arrangements were configured, at least for the period 2020-21.

Moving the discussion to resource-related matters, Four Cs mentions two factors for analysis: cost of interaction and shared resources.

The Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan for 2021 make clear that financial resources to respond to the Venezuelan migrant crisis is a strong topic of concern among R4V partner organizations. Among common agendas/strategies/goals, the document summarizes financial requirements for partner organizations to respond to the migration crisis, necessary for planning and fundraising. Nevertheless, understanding the term “shared resources” should not be limited to simply “financial resources” and should aggregate various institutional resources used to accomplish the mandate of each agency, fund, or program. Meaning it infers financial resources, human resources, premises and workspace, products, and services.

Strong evidence of collaboration through shared resources between UN AFPs in Brazil is the UN House, which constitutes shared premises and workspace. Cost-effective strategies are an important part of the Business Operations Strategy of the United Nations in the context of the 2030 agenda, the Sustainable Development Goals, and the UN Reform. Usage of common premises by two or more UN AFPs whenever possible and feasible is an excellent symbol of joint fronts of these agendas working. Not only it reduces costs, but it also makes their presence more robust in a country/location as it externalizes institutional unity among different bodies (UNDSG, 2021). In addition, it represents the fulfillment of a recommendation from 2006, when a high-level panel presented the *Delivering as One Report* to the UN General Assembly. Among various recommendations, it states the need to establish “one leader, one program, one budgetary framework and, where appropriate, one office” at the country level (UNITED NATIONS, 2006, p. 21). When UN common premises hosts the office of the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator, it is a UN House (UNDSG, 2021), which is the case of the UN House in Brasília.

In addition to the discussion around resources, worth mentioning how the Cluster Approach interacts with this subject. Although it is not clear if the Cluster Approach is the strategy locally adopted by the UN to respond to the migration crisis in Brazil, sure it takes advantage of international structures, communication lines, a spotlight of funding requests, among many other factors. The Cluster Approach facilitated the use of shared resources and funding requirements globally through common global appeals. During its first years, most resources of the Cluster Approach were spent at the global level (offices located in headquarter locations) (STREETS et al., 2010). As the strategy approaches the maturity level, a shift has begun from implementation at the global to the local level. From this, it is understood that as UN organizations and other cluster



lead agencies developed global mechanisms to operationalize the strategy, country offices could finally benefit from direct investments and financing.

Financial requirements increased to implement and sustain inter-organizational arrangements and interactions proposed by the strategy, raising some questioning on whether the humanitarian system benefits from it. About this, the second evaluation of the Cluster Approach made clear affirmations: while any cost of interaction is shared among UN member states and other interested donors, deficiencies and ineffectiveness in the strategy are charged at the greater extent to populations in need at a human cost (STREETS et al., 2010).

“Developing and implementing the cluster approach has required a significant financial investment. Over \$ 57 million has been raised through global appeals, global cluster lead organizations have contributed from their own budgets and annual coordination costs in each country with active clusters are several million dollars. This corresponds to less than 1% of total humanitarian aid.” (STREETS et al., 2010, p. 8)

Unlike the first evaluation of the Cluster Approach, now the cost inflected over UN AFPs has enriched results recognized, helping to advocate for the continuity and promotion of the strategy (STODDARD et al., 2007; STREETS et al., 2010). Therefore, the balance between investment and results now seems positive, showing improvement that reinforces the benefits and gains of its implementation.

Summing up to this, the second evaluation brought an interesting fact that is already defended by experts in business administration as a consensus for a while: not all expensive systems are the most effective. It means that having an effective humanitarian response network does not necessarily require the most expensive systems in place (STREETS et al., 2010); in fact, it means that it shall serve its objective. It should be practical, delivered in a timely fashion (considering that time is a fundamental part of all dynamics of crisis), functional and feasible. It corroborates that the most effective degree of inter-institutional interaction does not necessarily require more resources or has a higher cost. Thereby, institutional interaction degrees listed by Martin et al. (2016) should not be seen as a linear scale of efficiency but only

Important to note that the Cluster Approach and all related guidance matches what is mentioned in the theoretical framework as an effective crisis plan, according to Boin and Hart

(2010). As the Inter-Agency Standing Committee developed a general plan that divides responsibilities between accountable actors, most designated institutions have their own detailed and individual plans to cope with their responsibilities to their specialized mandates. As the second evaluation of the Cluster Approach affirmed, “clusters have created guidelines, manuals, tools, strategies and workplans” (STREETS et al., 2010, p. 70).

Even though global goals and objectives are often unclear to local staff, other goals are also established at the country level to reflect local challenges better. Those are known/followed by local staff to a greater extent. The second evaluation also considered it a practice to be recommended, allowing the crisis response system and cluster lead agencies to deliver the most needed assistance to the populations of concern (STREETS et al., 2010). It is also defended by Boin and Hart (2010) as imperative to effective crisis management, considering it allows flexibility and adaptability of crisis response systems. It directly affects the degree of embeddedness, which was translated previously as a kind of institutional “stickiness” to the strategy and compelling operational aspects.

The first evaluation mentioned a significant lack of knowledge among general Cluster Lead Agencies staff; three years later, the second evaluation affirmed that much advancement was made and now – although there is still room for improvement (STODDARD et al., 2007; STREETS et al., 2010). Professionalization of staff might address it, so they master Cluster Approach principles and expectations. Consequently, contributing to the success of this integrated strategy, while in a position to make better judgments if it is in the best interest of the organization and the institutional group to have any adjustments to core functions of the strategy.

Henceforth, the Cluster Approach seems not to meet a high frequency of interaction among actors. Although the evaluation does not mention frequency, analyzing institutions' interaction, in general, may give valuable hints about frequency. Considering the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) – a central figure in the international humanitarian response system –, for instance, and how it interacts with other teams in the field, there is still much room for improvement (STREETS et al., 2010).

Also, note that the UN often uses the term “coordination”, not collaboration, to name some mechanisms. This is the case, for instance, of R4V, the Regional Inter-Agency Coordination Platform – R4V. However, coordination is part of the name of some of the existing mechanisms, reminding that interchangeably usage of concepts and terms is not rare, just as it is in case of crisis,

emergencies, disasters, and hazards (Chapter 2). In any case, the R4V might be experiencing benefits from collaborative arrangements, although explicitly targeting coordination.

Considering characteristics of the Four C's introduced in the theoretical framework (which form the analytical categories of the unit of analysis, as per the analytical map), it is now possible to look to the degree of institutional interaction with solid foundations.

Collaborative arrangements appear to be part of strategic discussions made by high-rank staff responsible for developing response plans; senior management, primarily. As the focus shifts from strategic to tactical and operational levels, the interaction seems to move away from collaborative arrangements to cooperation and coordination. Still unsure if it is a conscious or unconscious characteristic of the object of the study, which would require consultations with critical global staff involved in the international humanitarian crisis response system to clarify. Some possible paths to explain cooperation and coordination closer to the field may be related to the fundamental aspect of a humanitarian crisis: time. It equally gets more scarce when moving from global structures to country offices, even because of how country offices are from affected populations and people in need. Future research is yet to understand better and in more detail if other crisis scenarios worldwide also observe this same relationship relation.

Even though staff in the field seem to do not widely exercise collaboration in their duties, they experience substantial direct effects of collaboration in higher structures. As seen previously, UN global norms and plans guide local activities to guarantee the fulfillment of the broad mandate of the UN and the specific mandate of each agency, fund, and program. These norms and plans are not a simple formality. Generic structures given by headquarter offices serve as a base for planning and implementation in the field; it allows country-specific strategies and activities while allowing a solid connection with global priorities. Therefore, planning, monitoring, and evaluation teams are responsible to actively assess and report on these, ensuring accountability and evidence-based approaches to humanitarian work.

In addition, it is essential to make some considerations on internal conflicts in the context of crisis management. Contributions of Bynander and Nohrstedt (2020) throughout the theoretical framework (chapter 2) forecasts conflicts between institutions and categories of responding actors in the scene of a crisis. Leo Denise's (1999) work brings this same logic but focuses on interinstitutional interaction, not limited to a crisis. Those combined offer valuable insights into how managers should address conflict. Rather than using it to disqualify more intricate joint work,

they shall consider conflict an integral and fundamental part of coordination and collaboration, not meaning resolutions to disputes should not be in place. It is indicative that teams are either coordinative or collaborative, from which UN entities may collect benefits – and, as a consequence, affected populations in need.

Finally, and in the light of the theoretical framework, there is strong evidence that collaboration grounds the international humanitarian crisis response system and the activities of United Nations agencies, funds, and programs in Brazil involved in responding to the influx of Venezuelan migrants.

## 5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Throughout this paper, the migration crisis of Venezuelan migrants in Brazil meets core management concepts while exploring the United Nations institutional response and its inter-institutional arrangement. Building upon Crisis Management (CM) and Collaborative Crisis Management (CCM) literature, this paper presented how is organized the international humanitarian response system. In sequence, it explored which international organizations would be responsible for responding to crisis, their mandate, and how they are present in Brazil. Also, a case study presented their degree of institutional interaction. In chapter 4, empirical evidence meets and confronts theory, resulting in the broader understanding of the phenomena of Crisis Management in real life and a humanitarian crisis. This analysis included some valuable insights based on the COVID-19 pandemic happening at the moment of research, demonstrating impacts in the national humanitarian system.

Crisis Management (CM) and the newborn concept of Collaborative Crisis Management (CCM) constitute a study area within management that still has much room for improvement and development, as mentioned by Nohrstedt et al. (2018). There is no broad knowledge of their essential components and characteristics, turning any dissertation over CM and CCM into a difficult path to follow. This paper uses up-to-date sources focusing on material from 2018 to 2021 whenever possible, building a fresh and contemporary look for CM merging knowledge around institutional interaction and collaboration that did not exist previously.

As this paper concludes, the research question is recalled: how UN agencies, funds, and programs in Brazil manage the migration crisis, and what is their degree of institutional interaction? In summary, it concludes that the degree of interaction between United Nations agencies, funds, and programs responding to Brazil's humanitarian crisis tends highly to collaborative arrangements, the most complex degree of interaction among all. While responding to the migration crisis of Venezuelans in Brazil, institutions tend to follow the general idea of the Cluster Approach, adding and reorganizing partners across clusters to adapt interinstitutional arrangements according to needs; which is also forecasted by the global normative since crisis response tends to be very country-specific (STREETS et al., 2010, p. 27)

Highlighting some significant contributions of this paper, we mention the analytical map. Solid research cut-outs show how each methodological component grounds on each other and

connects with core concepts mobilized during the theoretical framework. The analytical map was developed to facilitate the visualization of the organization, serving as a research roadmap and guiding the reader throughout the paper. Thereby, it proposes a guide for future studies on Crisis Management – related to humanitarian situations or not.

In addition, Figure 7 clearly illustrates the fundamental position of international organizations and NGOs in alleviating human suffering and delivering aid. The United Nations System is the major player in response to the influx of Venezuelan migrants in Brazil, also responsible for mobilizing the most significant amount of financial resources. It reiterates the need to keep strengthening and supporting the work performed by the UN and internationalism. Also, it identifies the significant participation of religious organizations in the response and their ability to mobilize crucial financial resources. Fundraising teams should have that into consideration.

Like any other research, this paper has its limitations; primarily, it must mention the decision to have this case study focused on analyzing official and public documents. Considering the UN internal policy on sharing internal information of the organization and considering all authorizations needed and the deadlines imposed over this paper to its completion, it would make this research unviable.

Nevertheless, as mentioned in chapter 3, some natural advantages may be attributed to the position occupied by the researcher; a high degree of involvement with the object of the study. The author's close relationship with the mentioned institutions and professional involvement with the object of the study is a limitation of this paper. This is an imposed and unescapable situation related to this specific research. Although impartiality was performed at the best capacity, considering the core characteristics to conduct a case study listed by Yin (1994), it is keen to mention that some unconscious bias may have implied some prior judgment over the object of and field of study. Nevertheless, equally keen to mention that this also acts as an advantage to some extent. Given the complexity of crisis management and the whole UN System, some fundamental links and relations were provided by the author's proximity to the research topic, which undeniably resulted in facilitated choices during the process.

As a critical question for future studies, this paper suggests directing attention to the concepts of the research context: crisis, underdevelopment, and resilience. One of the main activities of the United Nations at the country level focuses on the capacity building of national institutions, as seen previously. In the light of the theory that crisis and vulnerability of society are

aggravated by institutional failure, there is great potential on studying which Brazilian institutions experienced development as a direct consequence of the influx of Venezuelan migrants in Brazil – not just in relation to UN activities in the country, but broadening to the whole crisis response system. Therefore, it should collect evidence on vulnerabilities of Brazilian institutions tackled through migration response mechanisms. This may focus on a variety of topics and spheres: social protection, law enforcement, safeguarding of Human Rights, shock responsiveness to a crisis, among many other possible cutouts. Different social sciences may also be mobilized to provide a broader view to this complex topic: public management, political science, sociology, international relations, and philosophy. The book “Why Nations Fail: the origins of power, prosperity, and poverty” written by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2012) can be a start-point.

Finally, coordination and collaboration play an essential role in the international humanitarian system. While collaboration seems complex to implement, it requires significant institutional resources that may lack a humanitarian crisis. Nevertheless, it may bring valuable results only possible through the implementation of this interaction degree.

It is up to acting managers to use technical knowledge to the greater extent possible, grounding decision-making in evidence-based content to guarantee accountability to affected populations and people in need.

## 6 REFERENCES

AHRENS, J.; RUDOLPH, P. M. The importance of governance in risk reduction and disaster management. **Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management**, v. 14, n. 4, p. 207–220, 2006.

AL-DAHASH, H.; THAYAPARAN, M.; KULATUNGA, U. **Understanding the Terminologies: Disaster, Crisis and Emergency**. Proceedings of the 32nd Annual ARCOM Conference, ARCOM 2016. **Anais...**Manchester: Association of Researchers in Construction Management, 2016

ALPASLAN, C. M.; GREEN, S. E.; MITROFF, I. I. Corporate governance in the context of crises: Towards a stakeholder theory of crisis management. **Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management**, v. 17, n. 1, p. 38–49, 2009.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. **Venezuela 2019 Annual Report**. Disponível em: <<https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/americas/venezuela/report-venezuela/>>.

ANSELL, C.; BOIN, A.; KELLER, A. Managing Transboundary Crises: Identifying the Building Blocks of an Effective Response System. **Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management**, v. 18, n. 4, p. 195–207, 2010.

ANSELL, C.; GASH, A. Collaborative governance in theory and practice. **Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory**, v. 18, n. 4, p. 543–571, 2008.

BÉNABEN, F. et al. Collaborative systems in crisis management: A proposal for a conceptual framework. **IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology**, v. 434, p. 396–405, 2014.

BOIN, A. The new world of crises and crisis management: Implications for policymaking and research. **Review of Policy Research**, v. 26, n. 4, p. 367–377, 2009.



BOIN, A.; LAGADEC, P. Preparing for the Future: Critical Challenges in Crisis Management. **Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management**, v. 8, n. 4, p. 185–191, 2000.

BOIN, A.; 'T HART, P. Organising for effective emergency management: Lessons from Research. **Australian Journal of Public Administration**, v. 69, n. 4, p. 357–371, 2010.

BRAZIL. **Operação Acolhida: histórico**. Available at: <https://www.gov.br/acolhida/historico/>. Access: 12 Apr 2021.

BURNHAM, J. F. Scopus database: A review. **Biomedical Digital Libraries**, v. 3, p. 1–8, 2006.

BYNANDER, F; NOHRSTEDT, D. **Collaborative Crisis Management: Inter-Organizational Approaches to Extreme Events**. Stockholm: Routledge; 2020.

CICV. **Brasil**. Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/pt/onde-o-cicv-atua/americas/brasil>. Access on: 28 Feb 2021.

COOPER, T. L.; BRYER, T. A.; MEEK, J. W. Citizen-centered collaborative public management. **Public Administration Review**, v. 66, n. SUPPL. 1, p. 76–88, 2006.

COORDINARION PLATFORM FOR REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS FROM VENEZUELA. **Regional Refugees and Migrants Response Plan for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela - January-December 2019**. [s.l: s.n.].

DANIELS, J. P. Venezuela in crisis. **The Lancet**, v. 19, n. 1, p. 28, 2019.

DENISE, L. **Collaboration vs. C-Three (Cooperation, Coordination, and Communication)**. Available at: <https://www.sccharterschools.org/assets/documents/collaborationvsthe3cs.pdf>. Access on: 21 May 2021.

DU, H. S. et al. A bibliometric analysis of emergency management using information systems (2000-2016). **Online Information Review**, v. 41, n. 4, p. 454–470, 2017.

DUDDY, P. Venezuela: A Situation Report. **American Diplomacy**, p. 1–5, 2017.

DYNES, R. **Organizational Involvement and Changes in Community Structure in Disaster**. American Behavioral Scientist; 1970.

ELLIS, E. R. The Collapse of Venezuela and Its Impact on the Region. **Military Review**, v. 97, n. 4, p. 22–33, 2017.

EMERSON, K.; NABATCHI, T.; BALOGH, S. An integrative framework for collaborative governance. **Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory**, v. 22, n. 1, p. 1–29, 2012.

EXAME. **Casa da ONU é inaugurada em Brasília**. Available at: <https://exame.com/brasil/casa-da-onu-e-inaugurada-em-brasilia/>. Access on: 28 Feb 2021.

FAO. **FAO no Brasil**. Available at: <http://www.fao.org/brasil/fao-no-brasil/en/>. Access: 28 Feb 2021.

FAO. **FAO: its origins, formation and evolution 1945-1981**. Available: <http://www.fao.org/3/a-p4228e.pdf>. Access: 29 Nov 2020.

FERNANDES, E. **The Venezuelan Migration to Brazil**. Sweden: Malmö University, 2019.

FOREIGN POLICY. **How Venezuela Struck it poor**. Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/16/how-venezuela-struck-it-poor-oil-energy-chavez/>. Access: 18 Dec 2020.

FRANK, A. G. Development of Underdevelopment. **Monthly Review**, v. 18, n. 4, p. 17–31, 1966.

FREUDEN, S. A. Refugee Rights and Realities: Evolving International Concepts and Regime. **American Journal of International Law**, v. 95, n. 2, p. 204–210, 2018.

HÄLLGREN, M. Mechanisms of deviations: observations of projects in practice. **International Journal of Managing Projects in Business**, v. 2, n. 4, p. 611–625, 2009.

HELSLOOT, I.; RUITENBERG, A. Citizen response to disasters: A survey of literature and some practical implications. **Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management**, v. 12, n. 3, p. 98–111, 2004.

ICRC. **Aggravating factors**. Available at: <https://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-management/about-disasters/aggravating-factors/>. Access: 20 Apr 2020.

ICRC. **The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement**. Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/who-we-are/movement>. Access: 29 Nov 2020.

ICRC. **Mandate and mission**. Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/who-we-are/mandate>. Access: 29 Nov 2020.

ICRC. **Venezuela: Humanitarian assistance for affected people**. Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/venezuela-humanitarian-assistance-people-affected>. Access: 27 Dec 2020.

ICRC. **What is the ICRC's relationship with national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies?** Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/faq/5fmjhl.htm>. Access: 27 Dec 2020.

ICRC. **Venezuela: Supporting the most violence-affected population in 2019**. Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/venezuela-supporting-most-violence-affected-population-2019>. Access: 27 Dec 2020.

IMF. **Inflation rate, average consumer prices**. Available at: <https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PCPIPCH@WEO/WEOWORLD/VEN>. Access: 28 Dec 2020.

IOG. **Defining governance**. Available at: <https://iog.ca/what-is-governance/>. Access: 5 Jan 2021.

IOM. **About IOM**. Available at: <https://www.iom.int/about-iom#:~:text=IOM%20works%20to%20help%20ensure,refugees%20and%20internally%20displaced%20people>. Access: 29 Nov 2020.

IOM. **IOM Becomes a Related Organization to the UN**. Available at: <https://www.iom.int/news/iom-becomes-related-organization-un>. Access: 28 Nov 2020.

IOM. **IOM no Brasil**. Available at: <https://brazil.iom.int/oim-no-brasil>. Access: 20 Feb 2021.

IASC. **IASC**. Available at: <https://iog.ca/what-is-governance/>. Access: 11 Oct 2020.

JAHRE, M. et al. Approaches to the design of refugee camps: An empirical study in Kenya, Ethiopia, Greece, and Turkey. **Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management**, v. 8, n. 3, p. 323–345, 2018.

JR., W. L. . W.; STREIB, G. **Collaborative Collaboration and Leadership for Effective Emergency Management**. v. 66, n. 2, p. 131–140, 2014.

KAPUCU, N. Collaborative emergency management: Better community organising, better public preparedness and response. **Disasters**, v. 32, n. 2, p. 239–262, 2008.

KAPUCU, N.; ARSLAN, T.; DEMIROZ, F. Collaborative emergency management and national emergency management network. **Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal**, v. 19, n. 4, p. 452–468, 2010.

KAPUCU, N.; GARAYEV, V. Collaborative Decision-Making in emergency and disaster Management. **International Journal of Public Administration**, v. 34, n. 6, p. 366–375, 2011.

KAPUCU, N.; USTUN, Y. Collaborative Crisis Management and Leadership in the Public Sector. **International Journal of Public Administration**, v. 41, n. 7, p. 548–561, 2018.

KARSU, O.; KARA, B. Y.; SELVI, B. The refugee camp management: a general framework and a unifying decision-making model. **Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management**, v. 9, n. 2, p. 131–150, 2019.

KELLEY, L. The World Health Organization (WHO). **The World Health Organization (WHO)**, n. July 1994, p. 1–157, 2008.

KENYON LISCHER, S. Security and Displacement in Iraq: Responding to the Forced Migration Crisis. **International Security**, v. 22, n. 2, p. 95–119, 2008.

KNOPP, G. Gobernanza social, territorio y desarrollo. **Perspectivas em Políticas Públicas**, v. IV, n. n 8, p. 53–74, 2011.

MAHN, T. C. **Country-Level Aid Coordination at the United Nations: Taking the Resident Coordinator System Forward**. [s.l: s.n.].

MANIATIS, G. From a crisis of management to humanitarian crisis management. **South Atlantic Quarterly**, v. 117, n. 4, p. 905–913, 2018.

MANN, T. Strategic and Collaborative Crisis Management: A Partnership Approach to Large-Scale Crisis. **Planning for Higher Education**, v. 36, n. December, p. 54–64, 2007.

MARTIN, S. Making the UN work: Forced migration and institutional reform. **Journal of Refugee Studies**, v. 17, n. 3, p. 301–318, 2004.

MAYA, M. Venezuela: The Political Crisis of Post-Chavismo. **Social Justice**, v. 40, n. 4, p. 68–87, 2014.

MCCONNELL, A.; DRENNAN, L. Mission impossible? Planning and preparing for crisis. **Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management**, v. 14, n. 2, p. 59–70, 2006.

MCCOY, J. H.; BRANDEAU, M. L. Efficient stockpiling and shipping policies for humanitarian relief: UNHCR’s inventory challenge. **OR Spectrum**, v. 33, n. 3, p. 673–698, 2011.

NOBEL MEDIA AB 2020. **The Nobel Peace Prize for 2020**. Available at: <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2020/press-release/>. Access: 8 October 2020.

NOHRSTEDT, D. et al. Managing Crises Collaboratively: Prospects and Problems—A Systematic Literature Review. **Perspectives on Public Management and Governance**, v. 1, n. 4, p. 257–271, 2018.

OCHA. **What is the Cluster Approach?**. Available at: <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/coordination/clusters/what-cluster-approach>. Access on: 22 Oct 2020.

O’LEARY, R.; VIJ, N. Collaborative Public Management: Where Have We Been and Where Are We Going? **American Review of Public Administration**, v. 42, n. 5, p. 507–522, 2012.

OLIVEIRA, A. S. et al. Prospective scenarios: A literature review on the Scopus database. **Futures**, v. 100, p. 20–33, 2018.

OPAS. **OPAS/OMS no Brasil**. Available at:

[https://www.paho.org/bra/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=885:opas-oms-no-brasil&Itemid=672](https://www.paho.org/bra/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=885:opas-oms-no-brasil&Itemid=672). Access on: 28 Feb 2020.

ORAKHELASHVILI, A. The impact of peremptory norms on the interpretation and application of United Nations Security Council resolutions. **European Journal of International Law**, v. 16, n. 1, p. 59–88, 2005.

OSCARSSON, O.; DANIELSSON, E. Unrecognized crisis management—Normalizing everyday work: The work practice of crisis management in a refugee situation. **Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management**, v. 26, n. 2, p. 225–236, 2018.

OXFORD LANGUAGES. **Reciprocity**. Available at:

<https://www.google.com/search?q=reciprocity&oq=reci&aqs=edge.0.69i59j69i57j0i273j0l4.4444j0j4&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8>. Access on: 13 May 2021.

PALTTALA, P. et al. Communication Gaps in Disaster Management: Perceptions by Experts from Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations. **Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management**, v. 20, n. 1, p. 2–12, 2012.

PITTALUGA, G. B.; SEGHEZZA, E.; MORELLI, P. The political economy of hyperinflation in Venezuela. **Public Choice**, n. September 2019, 2020.

QUARANTELLI, E.; DYNES, R. **Response to Social Crisis and Disaster**. Annual Review of Sociology. Vol. 3 (1977), pp. 23-49

R4V. **Coordination platform**. Available at: <https://r4v.info/en/situations/platform>. Access: 11 Mar 2021.

R4V. **Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela**. Available at:

<https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2019%20RMRP%20Venezuela%20%28December%202018%29.pdf>. Access: 13 May 2021.

R4V. **RMRP 2021: for refugees and migrants from Venezuela**. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/RMRP%202021.pdf>. Access: 13 May 2021.

R4V. **RMRP 2020: for refugees and migrants from Venezuela**. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/72254.pdf>. Access: 13 May 2021.

REPORT, A. **Venezuela International Committee of the Red Cross Caracas Regional Delegation Activity Report 2019**. p. 1–12, 2019.

RICA, C. Abordagens E Concepções De Território E Territorialidade. **Revista Geográfica de América Central**, v. 2, p. 1–16, 2011.

ROBERT, B.; LAJTHA, C. A new approach to crisis management. **Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management**, v. 10, n. 4, p. 181–191, 2002.

SAFETY, S. **Interorganizational Collaboration In Crisis Response Management Exploring e Conditions For Improving Interorganizational Collaboration In Crisis Response Management Exploring The Conditions For Improving Collaborative**. [s.l: s.n.].

SAVE THE CHILDREN. **Brazil**. Available at: <https://www.savethechildren.org.uk/where-we-work/south-central-america/brazil>. Access: 27 Feb 2020.

SAVE THE CHILDREN. **Closing the gap**. Available at: [https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/node/15000/pdf/closing\\_the\\_gap\\_-\\_global\\_ambition\\_and\\_2019-21\\_global\\_work\\_plan.pdf](https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/node/15000/pdf/closing_the_gap_-_global_ambition_and_2019-21_global_work_plan.pdf). Access: 29 Nov 20.



SAVE THE CHILDREN. **Who we are**. Available at: <https://www.savethechildren.net/about-us/who-we-are#>. Access: 29 Nov 2020.

SOMERS, S. Measuring resilience potential: An adaptive strategy for organizational crisis planning. **Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management**, v. 17, n. 1, p. 12–23, 2009.

STARR, M. K. et al. Special Issue of Production and Operations Management: Humanitarian Operations and Crisis Management. **Production and Operations Management**, v. 21, n. 1, p. 209–210, 2012.

'T HART, P.; SUNDELIUS, B. Crisis management revisited: A new agenda for research, training and capacity building within Europe. **Cooperation and Conflict**, v. 48, n. 3, p. 444–461, 2013.

TLANUSTA GARRET, M. et al. Coping with Crises: The Management of Disasters, Riots and Terrorism. **Journal of Multicultural Counseling and Development**, v. 29, p. 147–158, 2001.

UNAIDS Brasil. **Novo site do UNAIDS Brasil facilita acesso a informações sobre HIV e AIDS no Brasil e no mundo**. Available at: <https://unaids.org.br/2015/09/1645/>. Access on: 28 Feb 2021.

UNDP. **Contato**. Available at: <https://www.br.undp.org/content/brazil/pt/home/about-us/contact-us.html>. Access: 20 February 2021.

UNDP. **Reducing Disaster Risk: a Challenge for Development-a Global Report**. [s.l: s.n.].

UNGA. **UN GA Resolution 319(IV) Refugees and stateless persons**, 1949.

UNHCR. **ACNUR Brasil: resposta à COVID-10, fevereiro 2021**. Available at: <https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/Brazil%20COVID-19%20update%20-%20February%202021%20PRT.pdf>. Access: 12 Apr 2021.

UNHCR. **Pedro Bial conta a história dos 70 anos do ACNUR.** Available at: <https://www.acnur.org/portugues/2021/02/18/pedro-bial-counta-historia-dos-70-anos-do-acnur/#:~:text=No%20Brasil%2C%20o%20ACNUR%20est%C3%A1,%C3%A0s%20pessoas%20refugiadas%20e%20ap%C3%A1tridas>. Access: 20 Feb 2021.

UNICEF Brasil. **Cooperação Sul-Sul.** Available at: <https://www.unicef.org/brazil/cooperacao-sul-sul>. Access: 28 Feb 2021.

UNICEF Brasil. **Presença no Brasil.** Available at: <https://www.unicef.org/brazil/presenca-do-unicef-no-brasil>. Access: 20 February 2021.

UNITED NATIONS. **About us.** Available at: <https://www.un.org/en/about-us>. Access: 11 Apr 2021.

UNITED NATIONS. **General Assembly Resolution 46/182.** Available at: <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/GA%20Resolution%2046-182.pdf>. Access: 22 October 2020.

UNITED NATIONS. **The Role of the Secretary General.** Available at: <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/role-secretary-general>. Access: 22 October 2020.

UNITED NATIONS. **United Nations Charter (full text).** Available at: <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text>. Access: 10 Oct 2020.

UNITED NATIONS. **Where we work.** Available at: <https://www.un.org/en/sections/where-we-work/>. Access: 11 Apr 2021.

UNSDG. **The United Nations System.** Available at: [https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/english\\_un\\_system\\_chart\\_11x8.5\\_4c\\_en\\_web-1.pdf](https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/english_un_system_chart_11x8.5_4c_en_web-1.pdf). Access: 12 Apr 2021.

WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME. **History.** <https://www.wfp.org/history>. Access: 8 Oct 2020.

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION. **Origin and development of health cooperation.**  
[https://www.who.int/global\\_health\\_histories/background/en/](https://www.who.int/global_health_histories/background/en/). Access: 8 November 2020.

## APPENDIX A - Members of the United Nations Country Team in Brazil

**TABLE 5**

Members of the UNCT in Brazil as on 14 May 2021.

<b>AFP</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Cluster Lead Agency</b>
RC Office	Silvia Rucks	Resident Coordinator	Yes
RC Office	Larissa Leite	RC Office Team Leader	Yes
RC Office	Isadora Ferreira	Programme Communications and Advocacy Officer	Yes
UNHCR	José Egas	Representative	Yes
IOM	Stephane Rostiaux	Representative	Yes
UNDP	Katyna Argueta	Resident Representative	Yes
UNICEF	Florence Bauer	Representative	Yes
WFP	Daniel Silva Balaban	Representative and Director	Yes
FAO	Rafael Zavala	Representative	Yes
WHO	Socorro Gross Galiano	Representative	Yes
OHCHR	Jan Jarab	Representative	No
UN ECLAC	Carlos Mussi	Country Director	No
ILO	Martin Hahn	Country Director	No
WIPO	José Graça Aranha	Regional Director	No
UN Women	Anastasia Divinskaya	Representative	No
UN-Habitat	Elkin Velasquez	Regional Director	No
UNEP	Denise Hamú	Representative	No
ITU	Bruno Ramos	Regional Director	No
UNAIDS	Claudia Velasquez	Representative and Director	No
UNESCO	Marlova Jovchelovitch Noletto	Representative	No
UNFPA	Astrid Bant	Representative	No
UNIC	Kimberly Mann	Country Director a.i.	No

UNIDO	Alessandro Amadio	Representative	No
UNODC	Elena Abbati	Country Director	No
UNDRR	Raul Salazar	Regional Director	No
UNOPS	Claudia Valenzuela	Representative	No
IFAD	Claus Reiner	Representative	No
IOM	Stephane Rostiaux	Representative	No
IMF	Joana Pereira	Representative	No

Source: UNDG, 2021.

# ANNEX A – Chart of the United Nations System




FIGURE 10 – Chart of the United Nations System  
Source: United Nations, 2019.